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INTRODUCTION 
The story of Joe Camel is a tragic one.1  Born and orphaned in 
Europe in 1974,2 Joe worked his way up the economic ladder to 
financial success.  Joe’s big break came in 1988 when the R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Company selected Joe to become the brand’s 
mascot, the “face” of Camel Cigarettes.3  Featured on the front 
panel of Camel Cigarette packages4
                                                                                                             
1 The following story is a dramatization.  The R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company began 
using Joe Camel, a whimsical caricaturized camel, as a marketing campaign in 1988. See 
Stuart Elliot, The Media Business: Advertising; Camel’s Success and Controversy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 12, 1991, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/12/business/the-
media-business-advertising-camel-s-success-and-controversy.html [hereinafter Elliot, 
Camel’s Success and Controversy].  However, despite its widespread success, the Joe 
Camel campaign was retired in 1997 amid great controversy—a large consensus believed 
Joe Camel was intended to, and did, target and encourage children to smoke. See Stuart 
Elliot, Joe Camel, a Giant in Tobacco Marketing, Is Dead at 23, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 
1997, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1997/07/11/business/joe-camel-a-giant-in-
tobacco-marketing-is-dead-at-23.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm [hereinafter Elliot, Dead 
at 23]; Elliot, Camel’s Success and Controversy, supra. 
—as well as various billboards, 
advertisements, catalogues, and promotional merchandise like 
2 See Elliot, Camel’s Success and Controversy, supra note 1. 
3 See id. 
4 See Joe Camel Ignites Fury by Appearing on Cigarette Pack, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
May 7, 1994, available at http://www.deseretnews.com/article/351820/JOE-CAMEL-
IGNITES-FURY-BY-APPEARING-ON-CIGARETTE-PACK.html?pg=all. 
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caps, t-shirts, and lighters5—Joe was catapulted into the public 
spotlight and instant stardom.  In fact, according to the American 
Medical Association, at the height of his career, Joe Camel rivaled 
the iconic Mickey Mouse in recognition among six-year-old 
children.6  However, in 1997, just nine years after beginning at 
Camel Cigarettes, Joe died of lung cancer at the young age of 
twenty-three.7  Joe was not a smoker, but all of the executives at 
R.J. Reynolds were.8
Unfortunately, Joe’s story is not uncommon among Americans.  
“Cigarette smoking kills an estimated 443,000 Americans,” 
including children, each year.
 
9  In fact, in the United States, 
cigarette smoking is the foremost cause of preventable death and 
disease,10 resulting in more annual deaths than “AIDS, alcohol, 
illegal drug use, homicide, suicide, and motor vehicle crashes 
combined.”11  For instance, “[a] consensus exists within the 
scientific and medical communities that tobacco products are 
inherently dangerous and cause cancer, heart disease, and other 
serious adverse health effects.”12
                                                                                                             
5 See Elliot, Dead at 23, supra note 1; Elliot, Camel’s Success and Controversy, supra 
note 1. 
  Furthermore, the negative health 
6 See Paul M. Fischer et al, Brand Logo Recognition by Children Aged 3 to 6 Years, 
266(22) JAMA 3145, 3147–48 (1991), available at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/
documentStore/m/z/w/mzw84f00/Smzw84f00.pdf. 
7 See Elliot, Dead at 23, supra note 1. 
8 This is a dramatization.  There is neither evidence nor intended truth surrounding 
this statement. 
9 See Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 75 Fed. Reg. 
69,524, 69,525 (Nov. 12, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2011)) [hereinafter 
Proposed Rule] (FDA proposing thirty-six graphic labels and eight textual warnings for 
public comment) (citing Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Smoking-
Attributable Mortality, Years of Potential Life Lost, and Productivity Losses—United 
States, 2000–2004, 57(45) MMWR 1226–1228 (Nov. 14, 2008), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5745a3.htm). 
10 See id. at 69,526 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH 
CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (2004), available at 
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/smokingconsequences/index.html). 
11 See id. (citing Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Surveillance for Cancers 
Associated with Tobacco Use—United States, 1999–2004, 57(SS08) MMWR 1–33 (Sept. 
5, 2008), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss5708a1.htm). 
12 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1224 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012) (Rogers, J., dissenting) (quoting Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco 
Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 2(2), 123 Stat. 1776, 1777 (2009) (codified at 21 
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effects of smoking are not limited to smokers, but also plague 
nonsmokers who inhale secondhand smoke.13  However, despite 
the fact that smoking cessation has been shown to prevent and 
even reverse these adverse health effects to a certain extent,14 
approximately one-fifth of Americans are cigarette smokers15—
perhaps partly due to the consensus within the scientific and 
medical communities that “[n]icotine is an addictive drug.”16
Accordingly, in 2009, Congress passed the Family Smoking 
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (“Smoking Act”), granting 
the Federal Drug Administration (“FDA”), for the first time, the 
authority to regulate cigarettes.
 
17  The Smoking Act was in 
response to scientific research indicating that current cigarette 
warning labels are ineffective.18  Specifically, after observing the 
adoption of pictorial cigarette warnings worldwide,19 the FDA 
concluded that larger prominent warnings, with pictures, “are more 
likely to be noticed, communicate information about health risks to 
consumers, and reinforce intentions among tobacco users who 
want to quit.”20
                                                                                                             
U.S.C § 387 Note (2011) [hereinafter Smoking Act]) (alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,527–29 (collecting 
scientific evidence). 
 
13 See Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,527 (citing Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, supra note 9). 
14 See id. at 69,529. 
15 See id. at 69,526 (collecting scientific evidence). 
16 Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1224 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (quoting the Smoking Act § 2(3), 
123 Stat. at 1777 (codified at 21 U.S.C § 387 Note (2011))) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,528–29 (collecting scientific 
evidence). 
17 Smoking Act § 3(1), § 201(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006 & Supp. 2009)). 
18 See Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,529–31. 
19 See id. at 69,525, 69,531–33.  “Countries/jurisdictions that have implemented 
pictorial warning requirements for tobacco packaging include: Australia; Belgium; 
Brazil; Brunei; Canada; Chile; Colombia; Cook Islands; Djibouti; Egypt; Hong Kong; 
India; Iran; Jordan; Latvia; Malaysia; Mauritius; Mexico; Mongolia; New Zealand; 
Pakistan; Panama; Paraguay; Peru; Romania; Singapore; Switzerland; Taiwan; Thailand; 
Turkey; United Kingdom; Uruguay; and Venezuela.” Id. at 69,525 n.4.  
“Countries/jurisdictions with pending requirements include: France; Guernsey, Honduras; 
Malta; Norway; Philippines; and Spain.” Id. 
20 Id. at 69,529 (citing Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Health Warnings 
on Tobacco Products—Worldwide, 2007, 58(19) MMWR 528–29 (May 22, 2009) 
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Pursuant to the Smoking Act, the FDA promulgated the 
Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements 
(“Final Rule”) in June 2011.21  The Final Rule marked the first 
change to cigarette warnings in the United States in over twenty-
five years.22  Unlike previous warnings, the Final Rule requires 
that one of nine graphic images, in conjunction with nine new 
textual warnings and a “1–800–QUIT–NOW” telephone number, 
appear on all cigarette packages.23  The Final Rule’s nine new 
warnings include graphic images such as “a man exhaling cigarette 
smoke through a tracheotomy hole in his throat” and “a plume of 
cigarette smoke enveloping an infant.”24  Furthermore, unlike 
previous warnings, the Final Rule’s warnings are not to appear on 
the sides of tobacco packages, but instead purport to cover the top 
fifty percent of the front and back panels of all cigarette packs.25  
Although the Final Rule was supposed to take effect in September 
2012,26
As of this Note’s publication, four courts (“Four Decisions”) 
have addressed whether the government’s requiring graphic 
warning labels on cigarette packaging violates the tobacco 
companies’ freedom of speech protected under the First 
 challenges to its constitutionality have halted its 
applicability. 
                                                                                                             
available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5819a3.htm); see also id. 
at 69,531–35 (collecting scientific evidence). 
21 Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 
36,628, 36,628–29 (June 22, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2011)) [hereinafter 
Final Rule]. 
22 See id.; Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,529; Kristin M. Sempeles, Comment, The 
FDA’s Attempt to Scare the Smoke out of You: Has the FDA gone too far with the Nine 
Cigarette Warning Labels?, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 223, 223 (2012). 
23 Compare Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,648–57, and 36,681, with Comprehensive 
Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-474, § 4(a), 98 Stat. 2200, 2201–03 (1984) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994)) [hereinafter CSEA]. 
24 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. United States Food and Drug Admin., 823 F. Supp. 2d 
41 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶¶ 57, 59); see also infra Part I.A.3. 
25 Compare Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,674, with CSEA § 4(a), and Proposed Rule 
75 Fed. Reg. at 69,529; see also Stephanie J. Bennett, Comment, Paternalistic 
Manipulation Through Pictorial Warnings: The First Amendment, Commercial Speech, 
and the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, 81 MISS. L.J. 1909, 1912 
(2012). 
26 See Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,628–29. 
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Amendment.27  In Discount Tobacco City & Lottery v. United 
States, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding 
that the new size and placement requirements and the inclusion of 
graphic images on cigarette warning labels are constitutional.28  
Furthermore, though the tobacco industry appealed the Sixth 
Circuit’s ruling following a denied request for rehearing and 
rehearing en banc,29 the Supreme Court subsequently denied the 
appellants’ petition for certiorari.30  However, in R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Administration, the D.C. Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding that the FDA’s nine 
selected images render the Final Rule’s cigarette warning labels 
unconstitutional.31  Thus, the D.C. Circuit vacated the FDA’s Final 
Rule and remanded it to the agency.32
Following the D.C. Circuit’s ruling, and a subsequent denied 
request for rehearing and rehearing en banc,
 
33
                                                                                                             
27 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012); Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery v. United States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012); 
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. United States Food and Drug Admin., 845 F. Supp. 2d 266 
(D.D.C. 2011); Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. 
Ky. 2010). 
 the FDA declined to 
28 Compare Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 561–565, with Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. 
Supp. 2d at 512. 
29 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Am. Snuff Co. v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1996 
(2013) (No. 12–521), available at http://www.natocentral.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/ 
11/Petition-for-Writ-of-Certiorari-to-U.S.-Supreme-Court.pdf; Brent Kendall & Jennifer 
Corbett Dooren, Tobacco Industry’s Challenge to Law Requiring Graphic Labels is 
Rejected, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22, 2013, 3:14 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142 
4127887323735604578438594078101904.html. 
30 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari Denied, Am. Snuff Co. v. United States, 133 S. 
Ct. 1996 (2013) (No. 12–521); Kendall & Dooren, Tobacco Industry’s Challenge to Law 
Requiring Graphic Labels is Rejected, supra note 29. 
31 Compare Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1208, with Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 268. 
32 Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1222. 
33 See Appellants’ Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied, R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., Nos. 11–5332, 12–5063 (D.C. Cir. 
2012), available at http://www.library.ucsf.edu/sites/all/files/ucsf_assets/order%20 
denying%20en%20banc.pdf; Gavin Broady, DC Circ. Won’t Rehear Tobacco Warning 
Label Case, LAW360 (Dec. 5, 2012, 1:36 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/399045/ 
dc-circ-won-t-rehear-tobacco-warning-label-case; see also Appellants’ Petition for 
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 
Nos. 11-5332, 12-5063 (D.C. Cir. 2012), 2012 WL 4844135. 
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appeal to the Supreme Court.34  Instead, the FDA intends to 
conduct additional research and create new graphic images for 
inclusion on cigarette warnings labels.35  In creating these new 
labels, the FDA may look to the Four Decisions for guidance in 
determining the constitutional parameters for selecting new 
graphic images.  Additionally, future courts will look to the Four 
Decisions in resolving any prospective challenges to the 
constitutionality of the FDA’s redesigned warnings.  However, 
these cases provide little guidance on the issue as both districts and 
both circuits are respectively split and employ differing 
constitutional standards of review.36  Furthermore, each respective 
circuit is internally split 2–1 in both its ruling and adopted 
constitutional standard of review.37
                                                                                                             
34 See Letter from Attorney General Holder to Speaker Boehner (Mar. 15, 2013), 
available at http://www.regulationonline.net/chapters/reg-ch7/fda-warnings (outlining the 
FDA’s intended course of action); Steve Almasy, FDA Changes Course on Graphic 
Warning Labels for Cigarettes, CNN (Mar. 20, 2013, 9:04 AM), http://www.cnn.com/ 
 
2013/03/19/health/fda-graphic-tobacco-warnings. 
35 See Letter from Attorney General Holder to Speaker Boehner, supra note 34 
(outlining the FDA’s intended course of action); Almasy, FDA Changes Course on 
Graphic Warning Labels for Cigarettes, supra note 34. 
36 See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1217 (applying “intermediate scrutiny” to hold the 
graphic warning labels unconstitutional); Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery v. United States, 
674 F.3d 509, 561–65 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying “rational-basis” review to hold the 
graphic warning labels constitutional); Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d 266, 276–277  
(applying “strict scrutiny” to hold the graphic warning labels unconstitutional); 
Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 520–21, 541 (W.D. 
Ky. 2010)  (applying “intermediate scrutiny” to hold the graphic warning labels 
constitutional). See generally Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 
(1985); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 
(1980); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
37 Compare Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1217 (majority applying “intermediate scrutiny” to 
hold the graphic warning labels unconstitutional), with id. at 1222–23, 1237–38 (Rogers, 
J., dissenting) (dissent applying “rational-basis” review to hold the graphic warning 
labels constitutional), id. at 1237–38 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (dissent holding the graphic 
warning labels also withstand “intermediate scrutiny”), and id. at 1234, 1236–38 (Rogers, 
J., dissenting) (dissent applying “intermediate scrutiny” to hold the “1–800–QUIT–
NOW” telephone number unconstitutional); compare Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 561–65 
(majority applying “rational-basis” review to hold the graphic warning labels 
constitutional), with id. at 522–31 (Clay, J., dissenting), 568 (dissent merging 
“intermediate scrutiny” and “rational-basis” reviews to hold the graphic warning labels, 
excluding the size and position requirements, unconstitutional). See generally Zauderer, 
471 U.S. at 626; Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557; Wooley, 430 U.S. at 705. 
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Accordingly, in an attempt to clarify the constitutionality of the 
FDA’s previous and impending graphic cigarette warning labels, 
this Note will analyze and attempt to resolve the Four Decisions’ 
divergent holdings regarding the Smoking Act and the FDA’s 
Final Rule.  Specifically, Part I of this Note will discuss the 
legislative background surrounding the Smoking Act and the Final 
Rule, as well as provide an overview of the legal background 
concerning the free Speech and commercial speech doctrines.  
Next, Part II will outline the current circuit split between the Sixth 
and D.C. Circuits, and identify the differing constitutional 
standards of review the Four Decisions employ. 
Contrary to the Four Decisions,38
Thus, this Note will conclude that if a picture is worth a 
thousand words, then the Final Rule’s graphic warning labels are 
worth a thousand words that violate free speech. 
 Part III will then propose that 
a “rational-basis” and “intermediate scrutiny” hybrid is the 
applicable standard of review, and, in an abundance of caution, 
include an analysis of the Final Rule’s constitutionality under 
“strict scrutiny,” “intermediate scrutiny,” and “rational-basis” 
reviews.  Finally, this Note will conclude that, except for its nine 
textual warnings, the Final Rule fails to pass constitutional muster 
under all three constitutional standards of review, and will suggest 
how new graphic warning labels can circumvent the Final Rule’s 
constitutional pitfalls. 
                                                                                                             
38 See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1217 (applying “intermediate scrutiny” to hold the 
graphic warning labels unconstitutional); Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d 509, 561–65 (applying 
“rational-basis” review to hold the graphic warning labels constitutional); Reynolds, 845 
F. Supp. 2d 266, 276–277 (applying “strict scrutiny” to hold the graphic warning labels 
unconstitutional); Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 520–21, 541 (applying 
“intermediate scrutiny” to hold the graphic warning labels constitutional). See generally 
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 626; Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557; Wooley, 430 U.S. at 705. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. Legislative Background—The FDA’s Attempt to Foster 
Smoking Abstinence 
1. Current Cigarette Warning Labels 
In response to the Surgeon General’s landmark report on 
smoking and health in 1964,39 Congress passed the Federal 
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965.40  This legislation 
required, for the first time, that a printed warning appear on all 
cigarette packages to warn consumers of the potential hazards of 
cigarette smoking.41  The warning, which was required to be 
conspicuous and legible, was displayed in small print on one of the 
side panels of cigarette packages.42  The warning read, 
“CAUTION: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your 
Health.”43  This language appeared on all cigarette packages sold 
from January 1, 1966, through October 31, 1970.44
Subsequently, in 1969, Congress passed the Public Health 
Cigarette Smoking Act,
 
45 which slightly modified the warning 
statements on cigarette packs.46  The new warning language read, 
“Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette 
Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health.”47
                                                                                                             
39 See Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,254, 69,525 (Nov. 12, 2010) (to be codified at 
21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2011)) (“In 1964, the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service 
issued the landmark report titled ‘Smoking and Health,’ which comprehensively assessed 
the available scientific evidence relating to the health effects of cigarette smoking . . . .”); 
see also id. at 69,529.  The report concluded that cigarette smoking is a health hazard of 
sufficient importance in the United States, and that appropriate remedial action was 
warranted. See id. at 69,525. 
  This label appeared on 
40 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 
(1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–41 (1970)) [hereinafter FCLAA]; see 
also Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,529. 
41 FCLAA § 4; see also Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,525. 
42 See FCLAA § 4; see also Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,529. 
43 FCLAA § 4; see also Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,529–30. 
44 See Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,530. 
45 Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 
(1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–41 (2006)) [hereinafter PHCSA]. 
46 Id. § 4; see also Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,530. 
47 PHCSA § 4; see also Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,530. 
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all cigarette packages sold in the United States from November 1, 
1970, through October 11, 1985.48
Finally, in 1984, Congress passed the Comprehensive Smoking 
Education Act of 1984,
 
49 again modifying the cigarette warnings to 
their present state.50  This legislation required that four new 
rotational51 health warnings be placed on all cigarette packages 
and cigarette advertisements.52  The four warnings read: (1) 
“SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung 
Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphysema, and May Complicate 
Pregnancy;” (2) “SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING: Quitting 
Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious Risks to Your Health;” (3) 
“SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING: Smoking by Pregnant 
Women May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth and Low 
Birth Weight;” and (4) “SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING: 
Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon Monoxide.”53  These are the 
warning labels currently required on cigarette packages.54
2. The Family Prevention and Tobacco Control Act 
 
In light of the superiority of international pictorial warning 
labels over America’s textual warning labels,55 Congress passed 
the Family Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (“Smoking Act”) 
in 2009.56
                                                                                                             
48 See Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,530. 
  The Smoking Act, for the first time, granted the FDA 
the authority to regulate the manufacture and sale of tobacco 
products in order “to promote cessation [of tobacco use] to reduce 
49 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–41 (1994). 
50 15 U.S.C. § 1333; see also Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,530. 
51 The Comprehensive Smoking Education Act mandated that the four warnings be 
rotated quarterly in alternating sequence to prevent the warnings from becoming stale. 15 
U.S.C. § 1333(c)(2); see also Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,530. 
52 See 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1), § 1333(b)(1); see also Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 
69,530. 
53 See 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1); see also Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,530. 
54 See Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,530. 
55 See id. at 69,531–35 (collecting scientific evidence). 
56 Smoking Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (codified in part at 21 U.S.C § 301 
Note, § 331 Note, § 333 Note, § 387, §§ 387(a)–(u), § 387(a)–(1), § 387(c) Note, § 391, 
§§ 392 and Note, §§ 393–399(a) (2011), and codified in part at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1333 and 
Note, § 4402 Note (2006 & Supp. 2009)). 
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disease risk and the social costs associated with tobacco–related 
diseases.”57
Under the Smoking Act, all cigarette packages must include 
one of the following nine new textual warnings: (1) “Cigarettes are 
addictive;” (2) “Tobacco smoke can harm your children;” (3) 
“Cigarettes cause fatal lung disease;” (4) “Cigarettes cause 
cancer;” (5) “Cigarettes cause strokes and heart disease;” (6) 
“Smoking during pregnancy can harm your baby;” (7) 
“Smoking can kill you;” (8) “Tobacco smoke causes fatal lung 
disease in nonsmokers;” or (9) “Quitting smoking now 
greatly reduces serious risks in your health.”
 
58  Additionally, the 
Smoking Act specifies that the labels “shall comprise the top 50 
percent of the front and rear panels of the package” and that the 
word “WARNING” should appear in capital letters in seventeen-
point font.59  Finally, the Smoking Act requires that “color 
graphics depicting the negative health consequences of smoking” 
must accompany the textual warnings.60
3. The Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and 
Advertisements Rule 
 
Pursuant to the Smoking Act, the FDA submitted a proposed 
rule for public comment on November 12, 2010,61 and 
subsequently published a Final Rule on June 22 2011.62
                                                                                                             
57 Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 520 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(quoting the Smoking Act § 3(9) (codified at 21 U.S.C § 387 Note (2011))) (alteration in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted); Smoking Act § 3(1) (codified at 21 U.S.C § 
387 Note (2011)); see also R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 
1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
  Under the 
Final Rule, one of nine graphic images is required to appear on 
all cigarette packages, along with one of the Smoking Act’s nine 
58 Smoking Act § 201(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2009)). 
59 Id. at § 201(a), 123 Stat. 1843 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. 
2009)). 
60 Id. at § 201(a), 123 Stat. 1845 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(d) (2006 & Supp. 
2009)). 
61 Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,525 (Nov. 12, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 
1141 (2011)). 
62 Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628 (June 22, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1141 
(2011)). 
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new specified textual warnings63 and a “1–800–QUIT–NOW” 
telephone number.64  The nine different warning labels are to 
rotate in publication according to an agency-approved plan.65
The Final Rule’s nine graphic warnings include color images 
of: (1) “a man exhaling cigarette smoke through 
a tracheotomy hole in his throat,” paired with the text “Warning: 
Cigarettes are addictive;”
 
66
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2) “a plume of cigarette smoke enveloping an infant receiving 
a kiss from his or her mother,” paired with the text “Warning: 
Tobacco Smoke Can Harm Your Children;”67
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
63 Id. at 36,648–57. 
64 Id. at 36,681. 
65 See Smoking Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201(a), 123 Stat. 1776, 1844 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 1333(c)(2) (2006 & Supp. 2009)); see also R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. United 
States Food and Drug Admin., 845 F. Supp. 2d 266, 270 (D.D.C. 2011). 
66 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. United States Food and Drug Admin., 823 F. Supp. 2d 
41 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Plaintiffs’ Complaint ¶¶ 57, 59); Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 
36,657; Overview: Cigarette Health Warnings, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (May 15, 
2013) (last visited July 29, 2013) (displaying the nine graphic images), 
http://www.fda.gov/TobaccoProducts/Labeling/ucm259214.htm. 
67 Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 41 (citing Plaintiffs’ Complaint ¶¶ 57, 59); Final Rule, 
76 Fed. Reg. at 36,659; Overview: Cigarette Health Warnings, supra note 66 (displaying 
the nine graphic images). 
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(3) “a pair of diseased lungs next to a pair of healthy lungs,” 
paired with the text “Warning: Cigarettes cause fatal lung 
disease;”68
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(4) “a diseased mouth afflicted with what appears to be 
cancerous lesions,” paired with the text “Warning: Cigarettes cause 
cancer;”69
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
68 Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 41 (citing Plaintiffs’ Complaint ¶¶ 57, 59); Final Rule, 
76 Fed. Reg. at 36,660; Overview: Cigarette Health Warnings, supra note 66 (displaying 
the nine graphic images). 
69 Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 41 (citing Plaintiffs’ Complaint ¶¶ 57, 59); Final Rule, 
76 Fed. Reg. at 36,662; Overview: Cigarette Health Warnings, supra note 66 (displaying 
the nine graphic images). 
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(5) “a man breathing into an oxygen mask,” paired with the 
text “Warning: Cigarettes cause strokes and heart disease;”70
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(6) “a stylized cartoon (as opposed to a staged photograph) of a 
premature baby in an incubator,” paired with the text “Warning: 
Smoking During Pregnancy Can Harm Your Baby;”71
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
70 Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 41 (citing Plaintiffs’ Complaint ¶¶ 57, 59); Final Rule, 
76 Fed. Reg. at 36,664; Overview: Cigarette Health Warnings, supra note 66 (displaying 
the nine graphic images). 
71 Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 41 (citing Plaintiffs’ Complaint ¶¶ 57, 59); Final Rule, 
76 Fed. Reg. at 36,665; Overview: Cigarette Health Warnings, supra note 66 (displaying 
the nine graphic images). 
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(7) “a bare-chested male cadaver lying on a table, and featuring 
what appears to be post-autopsy chest staples down the middle of 
his torso,” paired with the text “Warning: Smoking can kill you;”72
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(8) “a woman weeping uncontrollably,” paired with the text 
“Warning: Tobacco smoke causes fatal lung disease in 
nonsmokers;”73
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
72 Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 41–42 (citing Plaintiffs’ Complaint ¶¶ 57, 59); Final 
Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,665; Overview: Cigarette Health Warnings, supra note 66 
(displaying the nine graphic images). 
73 Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 42 (citing Plaintiffs’ Complaint ¶¶ 57, 59); Final Rule, 
76 Fed. Reg. at 36,667; Overview: Cigarette Health Warnings, supra note 66 (displaying 
the nine graphic images).  
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and (9) “a man wearing a t-shirt that features a ‘no smoking’ 
symbol and the words ‘I Quit,’” paired with the text “Warning: 
Quitting smoking now greatly reduces serious risk to your 
health.”74
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The FDA selected these nine graphic images due to their 
superior salience (i.e., noticeability and readability) and ability to 
depict the negative health consequences of smoking.75
                                                                                                             
74 Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 42 (citing Plaintiffs’ Complaint ¶¶ 57, 59); Final Rule, 
76 Fed. Reg. at 36,669; Overview: Cigarette Health Warnings, supra note 
  
Furthermore, the FDA believes that these images are consistent 
66 (displaying 
the nine graphic images). 
75 See Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,648–57, 36,637–38, 36,696; Proposed Rule, 75 
Fed. Reg.  69,524, 69,531 (Nov. 12, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2011)). 
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with the types of pictorial warnings required or developed by other 
international governments, such as Canada, the European Union, 
and Australia, whose “sets of warnings include a balance of 
images, some more visually disturbing than others.”76  The FDA 
also believes that “including a varied set of warnings is consistent 
with the existing scientific literature concerning the effectiveness 
of graphic health warnings.”77
The Final Rule’s new graphic warnings were scheduled to take 
effect for all cigarette packages manufactured on or after 
September 2012,
 
78 but challenges to its constitutionality have 
halted its applicability.79  Though the FDA intends to conduct 
additional research and redesign the Final Rule’s graphic 
warnings,80
B. Legal Background—The Free Speech and Commercial Speech 
Doctrines 
 this Note will, nevertheless, proceed with an 
evaluation of the Rule’s present constitutionality; such will aid the 
FDA and future courts in determining the constitutionality of 
prospective graphic cigarette warning labels. 
Both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from 
speaking are “complementary components of the broader concept 
of individual freedom of mind” protected under the First 
Amendment.81  This protection includes any governmental attempt 
“to compel individuals to express certain views”82 or “to subsidize 
speech to which they object.”83
                                                                                                             
76 Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,534. 
  Additionally, this protection 
“applies not only to expressions of value, opinion, or endorsement, 
77 Id. 
78 See Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,628. 
79 See discussion, infra Part II. 
80 See Letter from Attorney General Holder to Speaker Boehner, supra note 34 
(outlining the FDA’s intended course of action); Almasy, FDA Changes Course on 
Graphic Warning Labels for Cigarettes, supra note 34. 
81 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1211 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012) (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
82 Id. (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1977)). 
83 Id. (quoting United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410–11 (2001)). 
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but equally to statements of fact the speaker would rather avoid.”84  
“This holds true whether individuals”85 or “corporations are being 
compelled to speak.”86  Furthermore, this First Amendment 
protection also applies to commercial speech, including tobacco 
advertising,87 with “commercial illustrations [being] entitled to the 
[same] First Amendment protections afforded to verbal 
commercial speech.”88
However, there are instances when the government is permitted 
to infringe on one’s First Amendment rights.
 
89  This is true 
particularly for commercial speech, which the Supreme Court held 
is subject to less robust protection than other forms of speech—
such as religious or political speech.90
                                                                                                             
84 Id. (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 
557, 573–74 (1995)) (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
  In determining whether the 
government is permitted to infringe on one’s freedom of speech, 
the Supreme Court continuously acknowledges the importance of 
balancing the First Amendment with the public’s right to be 
85 Id. (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)). 
86 Id. (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 16 
(1986) (plurality opinion)). 
87 See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 527–28 (2001) (“the First 
Amendment protects the [tobacco advertisements] [] of petitioners”); Va. State Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761–762 (1976) 
(“[S]peech does not lose its First Amendment protection because money is spent to 
project it, as in a paid advertisement of one form or another.”) (citations omitted); 
Sempeles, supra note 22, at 239 n.155 (citing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 
U.S. 484, 500 n.10 (1996) (“[E]ven though ‘commercial’ speech is involved, such a 
regulation strikes at the heart of the First Amendment.”) (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & 
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 574 (1980)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
88 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985). 
89 See id. 
90 See id. at 651 (“Ohio has not attempted to ‘prescribe what shall be orthodox in 
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion’”); Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 
562–63 (1980) (citation omitted) (“The Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection 
to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.”); Reynolds, 
696 F.3d at 1212 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) 
(listing a “handful of ‘narrow and well-understood exceptions’ to the general rule that 
content-based speech regulations—including compelled speech—are subject to strict 
scrutiny”)). 
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informed.91  Commercial speech can help educate consumers by 
facilitating the greatest possible dissemination of crucial 
information.92  Compelled commercial disclosures, in particular, 
enable the government to warn unsuspecting consumers about the 
potential dangers of various products.93
Accordingly, in addressing these countervailing interests, 
courts utilize one of three constitutional standards of review to 
determine whether the government’s infringement on free speech 
violates the First Amendment.
 
94  Under the most-exacting Wooley 
“strict scrutiny” standard, the government must demonstrate that 
“the regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling 
governmental interest.”95  Under Central Hudson’s “intermediate 
scrutiny” standard, courts must determine whether: (1) the 
regulation counteracts speech that is not misleading and concerns a 
lawful activity; (2) the “governmental interest is substantial;” (3) 
“the regulation directly advances” the government’s interest; and 
(4) “the regulation is no more than necessary to serve” the 
government’s interest.96  Finally, under the least-exacting 
Zauderer “rational-basis” standard, the government’s regulation is 
constitutional if it is “reasonably related to the State’s interest in 
preventing deception of consumers,”97 and is not “unjustified or 
unduly burdensome.”98
                                                                                                             
91 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 500 (1996) (weighing the 
possibility that “a ban on speech could screen from public view the underlying 
governmental policy”) (quoting Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9); Sempeles, supra 
note 22, at 239 (citation omitted). 
 
92 See Bennett, supra note 25, at 1915 (citing Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561–62). 
93 See id. (citing Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 641). 
94 See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 626; Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557; Wooley v. Maynard, 
430 U.S. 705, 705 (1977). 
95 Bennett, supra note 25, at 1917 (quoting Wooley, 430 U.S. at 706) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
96 Id. (quoting Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
97 Id. at 1916–17 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
98 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651, 653 n.15 (holding the disclosure requirements not unduly 
burdensome under “rational-basis” review). But see Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery v. 
United States, 674 F.3d 509, 525, 566–67 (6th Cir. 2012) (Clay, J., dissenting) (majority 
opinion differing from the dissent in holding that compelled disclosures may be 
unjustified or unduly burdensome under “rational-basis” review). 
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Though these three constitutional standards of review appear to 
provide straightforward guidance in evaluating the constitutionality 
of governmental regulations compelling commercial speech 
disclosures, there has been much confusion and disagreement 
among courts in determining when a given standard applies.99
II. CONFLICT: THE SIXTH AND D.C. CIRCUIT SPLIT 
 
A.  The Sixth Circuit Employs Zauderer’s “Rational-Basis” 
Standard to Hold the Smoking Act’s Graphic Cigarette 
Warning Labels Constitutional 
In Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, six tobacco 
companies100 brought suit in the Western District of Kentucky 
against the United States of America and others.101  The suit 
alleged that provisions of the Smoking Act102
                                                                                                             
99 See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012) (dividing 2–1 over what commercial speech standard to apply); Disc. Tobacco 
City & Lottery v. United States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012) (dividing 2–1 over what 
commercial speech standard to apply); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. United States Food 
and Drug Admin., 823 F. Supp. 2d 36, 47–49 (D.D.C. 2011) (applying strict scrutiny to 
analyze the constitutionality of the Final Rule’s graphic cigarette warning labels); 
Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 520–21, 541 (W.D. 
Ky. 2010) (applying Central Hudson to analyze the constitutionality of the Smoking 
Act’s graphic cigarette warning labels). See generally Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 706 
(1977). 
 violate the tobacco 
companies’ freedom of speech protected under the First 
100 The six tobacco companies included Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc., 
Lorillard Tobacco Company, National Tobacco Company, L.P., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Company, Commonwealth Brands, Inc., and Conwood Company, LLC (currently known 
as American Snuff Company, LLC). See Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 509, 521 n.2; 
Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 512. 
101 678 F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. Ky. 2010).  The tobacco companies also brought suit 
against the FDA, Margaret Hamburg (Commissioner of the FDA), and Kathleen Sebelius 
(Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services). See id. 
102 The tobacco companies’ suit was brought over ten months before the FDA proposed 
any specific graphic images, and over seventeen months before the FDA published its 
Final Rule identifying the final nine graphic images. See Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 553.  
Accordingly, the tobacco companies’ suit challenged provisions of the Smoking Act, not 
the Final Rule. Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 521. 
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Amendment.103  Specifically, the tobacco companies challenged 
the Smoking Act’s requirement that tobacco manufacturers reserve 
a significant portion of cigarette packaging for the display of health 
warnings, including graphic images, intended to illustrate the 
dangers of smoking.104
Following the district court’s summary judgment ruling in 
favor of the government,
 
105 the tobacco companies appealed to the 
Sixth Circuit.106  Upon review, the circuit held that the district 
court erred in applying “intermediate scrutiny.”107  Nevertheless, 
the circuit employed “rational-basis” review to affirm the district 
court’s ruling.108  The circuit’s dissent found the graphic warning 
labels, excluding the size and position requirements, 
unconstitutional under a merged “intermediate scrutiny” and 
“rational-basis” standard.109  However, the circuit held that 
“rational-basis” review, alone, applied because the Smoking Act: 
(1) compels commercial speech disclosures of factual information, 
as opposed to compelled commercial speech disclosures of 
personal or political opinion;110 and (2) seeks to remedy the 
tobacco companies’ “potentially misleading” commercial 
speech.111
                                                                                                             
103 Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 521. 
 
104 Id. at 528–32; see also Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 520. 
105 Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 541. 
106 Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 518. 
107 Compare Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 558, with Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. 
Supp. 2d at 520–21. 
108 Compare Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 558, with Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. 
Supp. 2d at 512. The circuit’s holding was not unanimous, but was split between Judge 
Stranch, Judge Barrett, and Judge Clay. Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 518, 551–52. 
109 Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 522–31 (Clay, J., dissenting), 568 (dissent merging 
“intermediate scrutiny” and “rational-basis” reviews to hold the graphic warning labels, 
minus the size and position requirements, unconstitutional). 
110 Id. at 555–59 (citing Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 
1324, 1340–41 (2010); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 650 
(1985); National Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 114 (2d Cir. 2001)) (other 
internal citations omitted). 
111 Id. at 558 (quoting Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 641 (6th Cir. 
2010) (holding that “Zauderer applies not only when the required disclosure ‘targets 
speech that is inherently misleading,’ but also ‘where, as here, the speech is potentially 
misleading.’”)). 
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In employing “rational-basis” review, the circuit held it 
undisputed that the textual warnings constitute factual disclosures 
uncovered through scientific study.112  Additionally, the circuit 
held that graphic images depicting factual information can113 
constitute factual disclosures114 even if they are intended to 
“‘evoke a visceral response that subsumes rationale decision-
making.’”115
                                                                                                             
112 Id. at 568 n.16 (citing the World Health Organization, Report on the Global Tobacco 
Epidemic 44 (2011)). 
  Furthermore, the circuit held that the tobacco 
companies “knowingly and actively conspired to deceive the 
public about the health risks and addictiveness of smoking for 
113 Because the tobacco companies’ suit was brought over ten months before the FDA 
proposed any specific graphic images, and over seventeen months before the FDA 
published its Final Rule identifying the final nine graphic images, the tobacco companies 
could not argue that any specific graphic image violated the First Amendment. See Disc. 
Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 553.  Rather, the circuit court held that “[w]ithout any specific 
graphic images to challenge, Plaintiffs’ argument is and must necessarily be that the 
graphic-warning requirement on its face violates the First Amendment.” Id.  Accordingly, 
the circuit ruled that “[b]ecause Plaintiffs bring a facial challenge to the warning 
requirements, our concern is not the specific images the FDA chose . . . but 
rather whether Plaintiffs can show that ‘no set of circumstances exists under which [the 
statute] would be valid, or that the statute lacks any plainly legitimate sweep.” United 
States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587 (2010) (citations omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  “To satisfy this burden, Plaintiffs would have to establish that a graphic 
warning [can never] convey the negative health consequences of smoking accurately, a 
position tantamount to concluding that pictures can never be factually accurate, only 
written statements can be.” Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 559. 
114 The circuit court stated that a non-exhaustive list of graphic images that constitute 
factual disclosures include “a picture or drawing of a nonsmoker’s and smoker’s lungs 
displayed side by side; a picture of a doctor looking at an x-ray of either a smoker’s 
cancerous lungs or some other part of the body presenting a smoking-related condition; a 
picture or drawing of the internal anatomy of a person suffering from a smoking-related 
medical condition; a picture or drawing of a person suffering from a smoking-related 
medical condition; and any number of pictures consisting of text and simple graphic 
images.” Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 559.  Furthermore, the circuit held that “[t]here is 
nothing in the graphics-warning provision that forbids the graphics from merely being 
words.  For example, a graphic could consist of one of the required textual warnings—
‘WARNING: Tobacco smoke can harm your children.’—written in what appears to be a 
child’s handwriting.  Such a graphic would clearly be a factual and accurate disclosure 
that therefore would be scrutinized for a rational basis.” Id. 
115 Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 560 n.9 (quoting dissent at 529). 
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decades,”116 and, thus, current cigarette warning labels are 
“potentially misleading.”117
Finally, the circuit held that there is a “rational connection” 
between the required textual and graphic warnings’ purpose and 
the means used to achieve that purpose.
 
118  The circuit ruled that 
current cigarette warning labels are outdated and fail to effectively 
convey the risks of smoking.119  Additionally, the circuit held that 
the Smoking Act’s textual and graphic warnings are better able to 
promote public understanding of the full dangers of tobacco use.120  
Moreover, the circuit held that the size and position of these 
warnings, which cover the top fifty percent of the front and back 
panels of all cigarette packages, are not unduly burdensome 
because they help further such understanding.121  Accordingly, the 
circuit ruled that the graphic images are “reasonably related” to the 
warnings’ purpose of preventing consumers from being misled 
about the health risks of using tobacco, and, thus, are 
constitutional.122
B. The D.C. Circuit Employs Central Hudson’s “Intermediate 
Scrutiny” Standard to Hold the Final Rule’s Graphic Cigarette 
Warning Labels Unconstitutional 
 
In R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company v. United States Food and 
Drug Administration, five tobacco companies123
                                                                                                             
116 Id. at 562 (citing United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1105–08, 
1119–20, 1122–24 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“affirming the district court’s finding 
of deception for nine tobacco manufacturers—two of whom are plaintiffs in [Disc. 
Tobacco]”)). 
 brought action in 
117 Id. at 562–63. 
118 Id. at 561–62 (citing National Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d 
Cir. 2001)). 
119 Id. at 563 (collecting scientific evidence). 
120 Id. at 564–66 (collecting scientific evidence). 
121 Smoking Act § 201(a), 123 Stat. 1843 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2) (2006 & 
Supp. 2009)); Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 561, 561 n.10. 
122 Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 561–62, 565. 
123 The five tobacco companies included R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Lorillard 
Tobacco Company, Commonwealth Brands, Inc., Liggett Group LLC, and Santa Fe 
Natural Tobacco Company. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. United States Food and 
Drug Admin., 823 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2011). 
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the D.C. District against the FDA and other officials.124  The suit 
challenged the agency’s Final Rule125 requiring tobacco companies 
to reserve a significant portion of cigarette packaging for the 
display of graphic health warnings.126  Specifically, the tobacco 
companies alleged that the Final Rule’s graphic warnings 
unconstitutionally compel speech,127 and, thus, violate the First 
Amendment.128
Following the district court’s preliminary injunction
 
129 and 
subsequent summary judgment130 orders in favor of the tobacco 
companies, the FDA appealed to the D.C. Circuit.131
                                                                                                             
124 Id.  The tobacco companies also brought action against Margaret Hamburg 
(Commissioner of the FDA) and Kathleen Sebelius (Secretary of the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services). See id. 
  Upon review, 
the D.C. Circuit held that the district court erred in applying strict 
125 This case is distinguishable from Commonwealth Brands and Disc. Tobacco in that 
it challenged the FDA’s Final Rule. Compare id. at 43–44, with Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d 
at 521, and Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 519 
(W.D. Ky. 2010). See also discussion, supra note 102.  As opposed to Reynolds, both 
Commonwealth Brands and Disc. Tobacco were briefed and decided after the Smoking 
Act was passed, but before the FDA’s Final Rule was promulgated. See Reynolds, 823 F. 
Supp. 2d at 44 n.17 (citing Plaintiffs’ Complaint ¶ 24 n.3; Defendants’ Opposition ¶ 14 
n.7); see also Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 553; discussion, supra note 102.  Thus, the 
plaintiffs in Disc. Tobacco and Commonwealth Brands were incapable of challenging any 
of the nine graphic images the FDA ultimately selected. See Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 
44 n.17; see also Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 553; discussion, supra note 113.  Those 
plaintiffs, unlike the plaintiffs in this case, were only able to mount a facial challenge to 
the constitutionality of graphic warnings in general. See Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 44 
n.17; see also Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 553; discussion, supra note 113.  Accordingly, 
because this case turned on facts that were not available in Commonwealth Brands and 
Disc. Tobacco, it is distinguishable in that “it presents new questions of law and fact—
and new applications of law to facts.” Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 44 n.17. 
126 Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 43–44 (citing Trial Record at 9:1-3; 10:20-23). 
127 Id. at 44 (citing Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 
Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 573–74 (1995); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977). 
128 Id. at 44 (citing Trial Record at 10:20-23). 
129 Id. at 39. 
130 Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 519 (W.D. Ky. 
2010). 
131 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012). 
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scrutiny.132  Nevertheless, the circuit employed “intermediate 
scrutiny” to affirm the district court’s ruling.133
The circuit’s dissent found the graphic warning labels, 
excluding the “1–800–QUIT–NOW” telephone number, 
constitutional under “rational-basis” review.
 
134  However, the 
circuit held that “intermediate scrutiny” review applied135 because 
the circuit held that the FDA’s Final Rule: (1) compels commercial 
speech disclosures of personal opinion, as opposed to commercial 
speech disclosures of factual information;136 and (2) does not seek 
to remedy any “potentially misleading” commercial speech.137  
The circuit held that the Final Rule’s graphic images do not depict 
factual information because they are misleading and subject to 
misinterpretation.138  Additionally, the circuit held that even if 
cigarette warning labels are considered “potentially misleading” 
speech, “none of the proposed warnings [remedied such speech 
because they do not] purport to address the [consumer] information 
gaps identified by the government.”139
In employing “intermediate scrutiny” review, the circuit agreed 
with the district court that “the Government’s actual purpose [in 
requiring the graphic warning labels] is not to inform or educate, 
but rather to advocate a change in behavior—specifically to 
encourage smoking cessation and to discourage potential new 
 
                                                                                                             
132 Compare id. at 1217, with Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 271. 
133 Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1221–1222.  The circuit’s holding was not unanimous, but 
was split between Judge Randolph and Judge Brown, and Judge Rogers. Id. at 1208, 
1222. 
134 Id. at 1222–23, 1237–38 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (dissent applying “rational-basis” 
review to hold the graphic warning labels constitutional); id. at 1234, 1236–38 (Rogers, 
J., dissenting) (dissent applying “intermediate scrutiny” to hold the “1–800–QUIT–
NOW” telephone number unconstitutional); see also id. at 1237–38 (Rogers, J., 
dissenting) (dissent holding the graphic warning labels also withstand “intermediate 
scrutiny”). 
135 Id. at 1217. 
136 Id. at 1216–17. 
137 Id. at 1213–16. 
138 Id. at 1216–17. 
139 Id. at 1215 n.8. 
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smokers from starting.”140  However, unlike the district court, the 
circuit was uncertain whether the government’s interest in 
advocating for smoking cessation could constitute a “substantial 
interest.”141  Accordingly, the circuit proceeded with its analysis 
under the assumption that promoting smoking cessation is a 
“substantial interest.”142
Even assuming that the government has a “substantial interest” 
in altering smoking behavior, the circuit held that the FDA 
provided no evidence that the Final Rule’s graphic warning labels 
will “‘directly advance[ ] the governmental interest’” in reducing 
the number of Americans who smoke, “to a ‘material degree.’”
 
143  
Thus, the D.C. Circuit held that the Final Rule’s graphic warning 
labels are unconstitutional.144
III. ARGUMENT: THE FINAL RULE’S GRAPHIC WARNING LABELS 
ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
 
A. “Rational-Basis” and “Intermediate Scrutiny” Hybrid is the 
Applicable Standard of Review 
1. “Strict Scrutiny” Review Does Not Apply 
In contesting the constitutionality of the Final Rule’s graphic 
warning labels, the tobacco companies contend that the labels 
“‘attempt[] to regulate ‘what shall be orthodox in . . . matters of 
opinion’—i.e., whether individuals should buy and use a lawful 
product—[and, thus,] must be subject to strict scrutiny.’”145
                                                                                                             
140 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012) (citation omitted); see also Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1218; Reynolds, 823 F. 
Supp. 2d at 47–48. 
  
141 Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1218 n.13. 
142 Id. at 1218. 
143 Id. at 1218 (alteration in original) (quoting Fl. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 
618, 626 (1995); Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566); see also Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1219–
21. 
144 Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1222. 
145 Id. at 1226 n.5 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (quoting Appellees’ Brief at 31 (quoting 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985))) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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However, the Supreme Court has held that “our decisions have 
recognized ‘the ‘commonsense’ distinction between speech 
proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area 
traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties 
of speech.’”146  The Constitution therefore affords a lesser 
protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally 
guaranteed expression,”147 such as religious or political speech,148 
except under limited circumstances not here present.149  
Furthermore, the Court held that this distinction—affording lesser 
constitutional protection to commercial speech than 
noncommercial speech—applies to both speech restrictions and 
compelled disclosures.150
                                                                                                             
146  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 
(1980) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–456 (1978)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
147 Id.; see also Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566; Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. 
148 See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (quotation omitted) (“Ohio has not attempted to 
‘prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of 
opinion.’”). 
149 See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2665 (2011) (applying “strict 
scrutiny” to a commercial speech regulation imposing “a burden based on the content of 
speech and the identity of the speaker”); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 
2729, 2733 (2011) (citation omitted) (applying “strict scrutiny” to a commercial speech 
regulation affixing the number “18” to video games deemed “violent,” holding that 
“video games communicate ideas—and even social messages—through many familiar 
literary devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music),” and “‘esthetic and moral 
judgments about art and literature . . . are for the individual to make, not for the 
Government to decree, even with the mandate or approval of a 
majority’”); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (“[W]hen a 
State entirely prohibits the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading commercial 
messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process, there is 
far less reason to depart from the rigorous [‘strict scrutiny’] review that the First 
Amendment generally demands.”); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 
U.S. 1, 9, 10 (1986) (internal citations omitted) (applying “strict scrutiny” to a regulation 
that “discriminates on the basis of the viewpoints of the selected speakers,” and “extends 
well beyond speech that proposes a business transaction and includes the kind of 
discussion of matters of public concern that the First Amendment both fully protects and 
implicitly encourages”). 
150 See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501 (“When a State regulates commercial messages 
to protect consumers from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales practices, or 
requires the disclosure of beneficial consumer information, the purpose of its regulation 
is consistent with the reasons for according constitutional protection to commercial 
speech and therefore justifies less than strict review.”).  Despite the Court’s ruling, the 
Four Decisions are divided on whether “strict scrutiny,” absent an exception specified, 
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supra, note 149, applies to commercial speech disclosures. See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 
1212 n.5, 1217; id. at 1222 (Rogers, J., dissenting); Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 554 
(citing Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 651–52 (7th Cir. 
2006); id. at 527 (Clay, J., dissenting); Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 274; Commonwealth 
Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 520, 531.  Specifically, the argument posed is that the lesser 
protection espoused in the Court’s distinction—affording lesser constitutional protection 
to commercial speech than noncommercial speech—refers to “intermediate scrutiny,” 
which it is argued only applies to the commercial speech restrictions Central 
Hudson addressed. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557, 562–63; B. Ashby Hardesty, Jr., 
Note, Joe Camel Versus Uncle Sam: The Constitutionality of Graphic Cigarette Warning 
Labels, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2811, 2848.  Thus, according to this view, commercial 
speech disclosures must be examined under “strict scrutiny,” unless Zauderer carves out 
an exception for utilizing “rational-basis” review. See Hardesty, supra note 150, at 2846–
2849.  However, aside from ignoring Liquormart’s ruling, this argument must fail on its 
own face. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501 and accompanying parenthetical 
explanation, supra note 149.  It is true that the Court has never applied “intermediate 
scrutiny” to compelled disclosures. See Hardesty, supra note 150, at 2848.  However, the 
Court never specified Central Hudson’s contours, nor affirmatively limited its scope to 
commercial speech restrictions. See id.  Additionally, the Zauderer Court reiterated the 
commercial versus non-commercial distinction in two separate instances when applying 
“rational-basis” review to commercial speech disclosures. Compare Zauderer, 471 U.S. 
at 637 (citing Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557) (“There is no longer any room to doubt that 
what has come to be known as ‘commercial speech’ is entitled to the protection of the 
First Amendment, albeit to protection somewhat less extensive than that afforded 
‘noncommercial speech.’”) (other citations omitted), with id. at 638 (citing Cent. Hudson, 
447 U.S. at 566) (“Our general approach to restrictions on commercial speech is also by 
now well settled . . . .  Commercial speech that is not false or deceptive and does not 
concern unlawful activities, however, may be restricted only in the service of a 
substantial governmental interest, and only through means that directly advance that 
interest.”); see also Fl. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995).  Accordingly, 
it cannot be said that the distinction’s first articulation in Zauderer, though 
referencing Central Hudson, only referred to commercial speech restrictions for such 
would render the second articulation, which clearly referred to commercial speech 
restrictions, superfluous.  Rather, in repeating this distinction, the Court must have 
intended for the first articulation to refer to a general rule that all commercial speech, 
including disclosures, is subject to lesser constitutional protection than non-commercial 
speech, and then utilized the second articulation to apply this general rule specifically to 
commercial speech restrictions.  It is further true that the Milavetz Court held that 
“‘[b]ecause the challenged provisions impose a disclosure requirement rather than an 
affirmative limitation on speech, . . . the less exacting scrutiny described in Zauderer [and 
not Central Hudson] governs our review.’”  Hardesty, supra note 150, at 2848 
(quoting Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1339 
(2010)).  However, the Supreme Court has held that “the difference [between compelled 
speech and compelled silence] is without constitutional significance,” except that “in the 
context of commercial speech, compulsion to speak may be less violative of the First 
Amendment than prohibitions on speech and thus trigger a lower level of scrutiny.” Riley 
v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988); Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 
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None of the Four Decisions’ majority opinions, nor any of their 
dissenting opinions, deny that “[t]he speech at issue—proposing 
the sale of cigarettes—is indisputably commercial speech.”151  In 
fact, “[t]he tobacco companies [themselves] advance no argument 
that their cigarette packaging and advertisements propose anything 
other than a commercial transaction.”152  Accordingly, as the D.C. 
Circuit’s dissent in Reynolds stated, “because matters of opinion 
over whether individuals should buy and use a lawful product fall 
squarely within the domain of commercial advertising recognized 
by the Supreme Court, [the Final Rule’s graphic warning labels] 
thereof [are] not, as the [Reynolds] district court ruled, subject to 
strict scrutiny.”153
                                                                                                             
1227 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (citing Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650–51) (alteration in 
original).  Therefore, Zauderer must be viewed as a permissive exception to Central 
Hudson, not a restriction, whereas Central Hudson must be viewed as a restriction 
on Zauderer—though one’s First Amendment rights are not adequately protected in 
applying the most lenient “rational-basis” standard to the more violative commercial 
speech restrictions, applying the more stringent “intermediate scrutiny” standard to the 
less violative commercial speech disclosures further safeguards those rights (not to 
mention the government’s interests as the alternative argument requires “strict scrutiny” 
when Zauderer is inapplicable). See Hardesty, supra note 150, at 2849–2852 (applying 
“strict scrutiny” to commercial disclosures when Zauderer is inapplicable).  
Thus, Milavetz did not hold nor imply that “intermediate scrutiny” cannot apply to 
commercial speech disclosures where “rational-basis” review is inapplicable (such as 
where the regulation does not address potentially misleading speech); rather, the Court 
held that where a regulation does not concern a commercial speech restriction, but a 
disclosure that falls under Zauderer’s ambit, “rational-basis” review takes precedence 
over “intermediate scrutiny.” Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1339.  Nevertheless, even 
assuming, arguendo, that “strict scrutiny” applies in “intermediate scrutiny’s” place, the 
Final Rule’s graphic warning labels do not even withstand the much lower “intermediate 
scrutiny” and “rational-basis” standards of review. See infra Part III.B.  Accordingly, this 
Note will proceed with its analysis under the lower burdens of Central 
Hudson and Zauderer. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566; Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. 
  Thus, “the question is whether, under the 
traditional standards adopted by the Supreme Court, the 
government’s [graphic] warning label requirement is subject to the 
151 Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1217, 1222, 1226 n.5 (Rogers, J., dissenting); Reynolds, 845 
F. Supp. 2d at 272–74; Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 518, 522, 551–52 (Clay, J., 
dissenting); Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 520–21. 
152 Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1226 n.5 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
153 Id. (citing Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651; Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562; United States 
v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1142–44 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). But see discussion, 
supra note 150. 
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‘less exacting scrutiny’ of Zauderer [], or to intermediate scrutiny 
under Central Hudson.”154
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Reynolds district court and 
the comparable Seventh Circuit Blagojevich court were correct in 
applying “strict scrutiny” to the present issue,
 
155 the Final Rule’s 
graphic warning labels do not even withstand the much lower 
“intermediate scrutiny” and “rational-basis” standards of review.156  
Accordingly, this Note will proceed with its analysis under the 
lower burdens of Central Hudson and Zauderer.157
2. “Rational-Basis” Review Only Applies to Four of the Final 
Rule’s Graphic Images 
 
At first glance, it appears that “rational-basis” review applies to 
all nine of the Final Rule’s graphic images and textual warnings, 
and the “1–800–QUIT–NOW” telephone number.  For instance, 
the Supreme Court held that “because the challenged provisions 
impose a disclosure requirement rather than an affirmative 
limitation on speech, . . . the less exacting scrutiny described in 
Zauderer governs our review.”158
                                                                                                             
154 Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1222 (internal citations omitted) (Rogers, J., dissenting). But 
see discussion, supra note 
  According to the Supreme 
150. 
155 Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 2006); Reynolds, 
823 F. Supp. 2d at 46; Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 274.  Blagojevich is comparable to 
the present issue in that it addressed mandated warning labels affixing the number “18” to 
video games deemed “sexually explicit.” Blagojevich, 469 F.3d at 641.  
However, Blagojevich can be distinguished from the present issue as it “involved labels 
that were necessarily subjective and exclusively nonfactual.” Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1231 
n.9 (Rogers, J., dissenting); see also Blagojevich, 469 F.3d at 652 (“The sticker 
ultimately communicates a subjective and highly controversial message—that the game’s 
content is sexually explicit.”).  Unlike the Final Rule’s warning labels, the very definition 
of “sexually explicit” is necessarily opinion based, and, thus, Blagojevich’s “labels [are] 
nonfactual because there [are] no facts to convey.” Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1231 n.9 
(Rogers, J., dissenting); infra text accompanying notes 192–95.  Additionally, unlike the 
present issue, “strict scrutiny” may be applied in Blagojevich under the rationale 
espoused in Brown. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733 and accompanying parenthetical 
explanation, supra note 149. 
156 See infra Part III.B. 
157 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566; Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. 
158 Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1339 (2010).  
The Court’s ruling, however, does not foreclose the application of “intermediate 
scrutiny” to compelled disclosures. See supra note 150. 
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Court, this is because “disclosure requirements trench much more 
narrowly on an advertiser’s interests than do flat prohibitions on 
speech.”159
It is true that an argument can be made that the size of the 
warnings—which cover the top fifty percent of the front and back 
panels of all cigarette packages
 
160—inhibits the tobacco 
companies’ ability to add more information or advertisements to 
the cigarette packages, and, thus, affirmatively limit their speech.  
However, the tobacco companies have not provided “any evidence 
that similar restrictions elsewhere have hindered the tobacco 
companies ability to get their own message to consumers,”161 nor 
that the tobacco companies would have utilized the confiscated 
portions to provide additional information or advertisements.162
However, though the Final Rule’s graphic warning labels 
appear to only impose disclosure requirements, such, alone, does 
not meet the Supreme Court’s threshold for applying “rational-
basis” review.
  
Accordingly, it seems clear that the Final Rule’s graphic warning 
labels do not affirmatively limit free speech, and, thus, should be 
subject to “rational-basis” review. 
163
                                                                                                             
159 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. 
  In addition to not affirmatively limiting speech, 
160 See Final Rule, 76 Fed Reg. 36,628, 36,674 (June 22, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 
1141 (2011)). 
161 Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1233 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
162 See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1205; Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 509; Reynolds, 845 F. 
Supp. 2d at 266; Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 512.  Perhaps an argument 
can also be made that the Final Rule’s warning labels—which cover the top fifty percent 
of the front and back panels of all cigarette packages—prevent the tobacco companies 
from advertising or providing information on the portion of cigarette packages most 
likely to be seen and read by consumers, and, thus, affirmatively limit and hinder their 
ability to disseminate information (at least in regard to some consumers who will not read 
the bottom portions or side panels of cigarette packages). See Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 
36,674.  However, as stated above, the tobacco companies have not provided “any 
evidence that similar restrictions elsewhere have hindered the tobacco companies’ ability 
to get their own message to consumers.” Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1233 (Rogers, J., 
dissenting).  Additionally, because it appears that the Final Rule’s graphic warning labels 
do not even withstand the less-exacting “rational-basis” standard of review, this Note will 
proceed with its analysis under the assumption that the warning labels do not 
affirmatively limit the tobacco companies’ free speech. See infra Part III.B. 
163 See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. 
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the Supreme Court has held that, for Zauderer to apply, the 
regulation must impose compelled disclosers of “purely factual and 
uncontroversial information.”164  This requirement is buttressed by 
the policy consideration behind applying lower scrutiny to 
commercial speech disclosures.165  As the Supreme Court stated, 
“[b]ecause the extension of First Amendment protection to 
commercial speech is justified principally by the value to 
consumers of the information such speech provides, appellants’ 
constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular 
factual information in his advertising is minimal.”166
Furthermore, before “rational-basis” review may be applied, 
the commercial speech disclosure must involve “potentially 
misleading” speech.
 
167  As the Supreme Court held, Zauderer 
applies to regulations “directed at misleading commercial speech,” 
but “[i]f the communication is neither misleading nor related to 
unlawful activity, the government’s power is more 
circumscribed[—][t]he State must assert a substantial interest . . . 
[and] the restriction must directly advance the state interest 
involved.”168  Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the 
speech need not actually be misleading for “rational-basis” review 
to apply.169  According to the Court, the government need only 
show that the targeted commercial speech presents the “possibility 
of deception” or a “tendency to mislead.”170  In fact, if the speech 
is actually misleading, the Supreme Court has held that it enjoys no 
First Amendment protection.171
                                                                                                             
164 Id. 
 
165 See id. 
166 Id.  (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748 (1976)). 
167 See Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1339; Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. 
168 Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1339; Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564; see also 44 Liquormart, 
Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 508 (1996) (applying Central Hudson to non-
misleading commercial speech); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768–69 (1993) 
(applying Central Hudson to non-misleading commercial speech). 
169 See Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1340. 
170 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1227 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012) (Rogers, J., dissenting) (citing Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1340) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted)). 
171 See id. (citing Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002); Cent. 
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
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This requirement that the speech be “potentially misleading” 
for Zauderer to apply also accords with the policy consideration 
behind applying lower scrutiny to commercial speech 
disclosures.172  As the Supreme Court held, “‘warning[s] or 
disclaimer[s] [enjoy lower constitutional protection] . . . in order to 
dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion and deception.’”173
Among the Four Decisions, there seems to be unanimity that 
the labels must consist of factual information and address 
“potentially misleading” speech for “rational-basis” review to 
apply.
 
174  However, the Four Decisions disagree on whether the 
warning labels must consist of purely factual and uncontroversial 
information.175  Additionally, there is disagreement across these 
decisions regarding whether the warning labels must seek to, and 
actually, remedy “potentially misleading” speech.176
Nevertheless, even assuming, arguendo, that the Final Rule’s 
graphic warning labels need not provide purely factual and 
  Accordingly, 
in an abundance of caution, this Note will proceed with its analysis 
under the assumption that the warning labels need not contain 
purely factual and uncontroversial information, and need not seek 
to, nor actually, remedy “potentially misleading” speech for 
Zauderer review to apply. 
                                                                                                             
172 See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
173 Id. (first and second alterations in original) (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 
(1982) (citations omitted)). 
174 See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1213–17, 1227–32 (Rogers, J., dissenting); R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 845 F.Supp.2d 266, 272–274 (D.D.C. 2012); 
Disc. Tobacco & Lottery, Inc. v. U.S., 674 F.3d 509, 522–31, 555–59 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(Clay, J., dissenting); Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. U.S., 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 512 
(W.D. Ky. 2010). 
175 Compare Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1215 (holding information must be purely factual 
and uncontroversial for Zauderer to apply), and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food 
& Drug Admin., 823 F.Supp. 2d 36, 45 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding information must be 
purely factual and uncontroversial for Zauderer to apply), with  Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d 
at 558–559 n.8 (holding information need not be purely factual and uncontroversial for 
Zauderer to apply). 
176 See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1215–16 n.8 (holding information must seek to, and 
actually, remedy “potentially misleading” speech for Zauderer to apply); Disc. Tobacco, 
674 F.3d at 558 (holding information need not seek to, nor actually, remedy “potentially 
misleading” speech for Zauderer to apply) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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uncontroversial information, and need not seek to, nor actually, 
remedy “potentially misleading” speech, “rational-basis” review 
only applies to the Final Rule’s nine textual warnings and four of 
its graphic images.  None of the Four Decisions, nor the tobacco 
companies themselves, assert that the nine textual warnings 
contain non-factual information.177  Additionally, it seems that 
cigarette packages do constitute “potentially misleading” 
speech.178  However, only four of the Final Rule’s nine graphic 
images depict factual information.179  Accordingly, because five of 
the Final Rule’s graphic images and the “1–800–QUIT–NOW” 
telephone number fail to convey any factual information,180 these 
five images and the quit-line number must be reviewed under 
“intermediate scrutiny.”181
a) Only Four of the Final Rule’s Graphic Images Depict 
Factual Information 
 
The FDA concedes that the Final Rule’s nine graphic images 
evoke an emotional response intended to shock the viewer to retain 
the information in the textual warnings.182  However, the fact that 
“‘the graphic warning labels are intended to create a visceral 
reaction in the consumer, in order to make a consumer less 
emotionally likely to use or purchase a tobacco product;’ and that 
‘colorful graphic images can evoke a visceral response that 
subsumes rationale [sic] decision-making,’” does not render these 
images non-factual.183
                                                                                                             
177 See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1217–23, 1229–30 (Rogers, J., dissenting); Reynolds, 845 
F. Supp. 2d 266; Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d 509; Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d 
512. 
 
178 See infra Part III.A.2.b. 
179 See infra Part III.A.2.a. 
180 See id. 
181 But see discussion, supra note 150. 
182 See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1216 (citing Appellants’ Brief at 33 (“citing research 
showing that ‘pictures are easier to remember than words’”), 38 (“citing FDA’s finding 
that a substantial body of scientific literature shows that emotional responses, such as 
worry and disgust, ‘reliably predict the likelihood that consumers will understand and 
appreciate the substance of the warnings’”)). 
183 Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 560 n.9 (quoting dissent at 529). 
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As the D.C. Circuit in Reynolds held, “factually accurate, 
emotive, and persuasive are not mutually exclusive descriptions; 
the emotive quality of the selected images does not necessarily 
undermine the warnings’ factual accuracy.”184  Furthermore, the 
use of graphic images, even if digitally enhanced or illustrated, 
does not necessarily render the warnings nonfactual.185  For 
instance, the Supreme Court held that “‘[t]he use of illustrations or 
pictures in advertisements serves important communicative 
functions: it attracts the attention of the audience to the advertiser’s 
message, and it may also serve to impart information directly.’”186
Accordingly, it seems clear that four of the Final Rule’s 
graphic images depict factual information regarding the negative 
health consequences of smoking.  The images of: (1) “a pair of 
diseased lungs next to a pair of healthy lungs;” (2) “a diseased 
mouth afflicted with what appears to be cancerous lesions;” (3) “a 
man breathing into an oxygen mask;” and (4) “a stylized cartoon 
(as opposed to a staged photograph) of a premature baby in an 
incubator”
 
187 “are, in fact, accurate depictions of the negative 
effects of sickness and disease caused by smoking,”188 and “the 
tobacco companies do not suggest otherwise.”189  “That such 
images are not [] comforting to look at does not necessarily make 
them inaccurate.”190
                                                                                                             
184 Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1230 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
  The fact is, “‘the severe, life-threatening and 
sometimes disfiguring health effects of smoking conveyed in the 
185 See id. 
186 Id. (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of 
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 647 (1985)) (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. NASA, 920 F.2d 1002, 1005 
(D.C. Cir. 1990); 16 C.F.R. § 1500.14 (2011) (“requiring skull-and-crossbones warnings 
on poisonous products”)). 
187 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 823 F.Supp.2d 36, 41–42 
(D.D.C. 2011) (citing Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶¶ 57, 59); see also supra Part I.A.3 
(displaying the nine graphic images). 
188 Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1230 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (quoting Final Rule, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 36,628, 36,696 (June 22, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2011)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,524, 69,527–29 (Nov. 
12, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2011)) (collecting scientific evidence). 
189 Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1230 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
190 Id. 
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required warnings are disturbing and the images [] . . . selected 
appropriately reflect this fact.”’191
Though the Seventh Circuit in Blagojevich held that a four-
square-inch sticker with the number “18” (representing a restricted 
age requirement) amounted to non-factual information,
 
192 
Blagojevich is distinguishable from the present issue.  As the Sixth 
Circuit stated in Discount Tobacco, “what constitutes a sexually 
explicit video game is a matter of personal taste and sexual morals 
that is necessarily based on opinion, as enshrined in the very 
definition of ‘sexually explicit’ that Blagojevich examined.”193  “In 
other words, a game could be deemed sexually explicit solely on 
the basis of widely divergent local standards.”194  Thus, the Sixth 
Circuit concluded, “[a] required disclosure announcing that the 
game is sexually explicit communicates the government’s opinion 
that the game is sexually explicit.”195  In contrast, “[t]he health 
risks of smoking tobacco have been uncovered through scientific 
study.  They are facts.  Warnings about these risks—whether 
textual or graphic—can communicate these facts.”196
However, five of the Final Rule’s graphic images “fail[] to 
convey any factual information supported by evidence about the 
actual health consequences of smoking.”
 
197
                                                                                                             
191 Id. (quoting Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,696) (emphasis omitted). 
  In fact, the FDA 
admits that the images of: (1) “a man exhaling cigarette smoke 
through a tracheotomy hole in his throat;” (2) “a plume of cigarette 
smoke enveloping an infant receiving a kiss from his or her 
mother;” (3) “a bare-chested male cadaver lying on a table, and 
featuring what appears to be post-autopsy chest staples down the 
middle of his torso;” (4) “a woman weeping uncontrollably;” and 
(5) “a man wearing a t-shirt that features a ‘no smoking’ symbol 
192 Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 643, 651–52 (7th Cir. 2006). 
193 Disc. Tobacco & Lottery, Inc. v. U.S., 674 F.3d 509, 561 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(referencing Blagojevich, 469 F.3d at 648–50). 
194 Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
195 Id. 
196 Id. 
197 R.J, Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 845 F. Supp. 2d 266, 273 
(D.D.C. 2012). 
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and the words ‘I Quit,’”198 are not meant to be interpreted literally, 
but rather symbolize their accompanying textual warning 
statements—“which provide ‘additional context for what is 
shown.’”199
Furthermore, in addition to not depicting any factual 
information regarding the negative health consequences of 
smoking, two of these images actually depict misleading 
information.  Specifically, the image of “a man exhaling cigarette 
smoke through a tracheotomy hole in his throat”
 
200 suggests that 
such a procedure is a common consequence of smoking.201  
However, the FDA concedes that such information is inaccurate.202  
Instead, the FDA claims the image is used to symbolize “‘the 
addictive nature of smoking,’” a fact the image does not accurately 
depict.203  Additionally, the image of “a bare-chested male cadaver 
lying on a table, and featuring what appears to be post-autopsy 
chest staples down the middle of his torso,”204 suggests that 
smoking leads to autopsies.205  However, the FDA provides no 
evidence that autopsies are a common consequence of smoking.206  
Instead, the FDA contends that “the image symbolizes that 
‘smoking kills 443,000 Americans each year,’”207
It is true that the D.C. Circuit’s dissent in Reynolds held that 
“[a]ll of these objections pertain to the images divorced from their 
accompanying text and thus fail to address the relevant question—
 a fact that image 
does not accurately depict. 
                                                                                                             
198 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 823 F. Supp. 2d 36, 41–
42 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶¶ 57, 59); see also supra Part I.A.3 
(displaying the nine graphic images). 
199 Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1216 (quoting Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628, 36,655 (June 
22, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2011)). 
200 Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 41 (citing Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶¶ 57, 59); see also 
supra Part I.A.3 (displaying the nine graphic images). 
201 See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1216. 
202 See Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 273 (citing Defendants’ Opposition at 43). 
203 Id. (quoting Defendants’ Opposition at 43). 
204 Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 41–42 (citing Plaintiff’s Complaint at ¶¶ 57, 59); see 
also supra Part I.A.3 (displaying the nine graphic images). 
205 See Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 273. 
206 See Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 273 (citing Defendants’ Opposition at 42). 
207 Id. (quoting Defendants’ Opposition at 42). 
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whether the images render the overall message conveyed by the 
warning labels nonfactual.  Viewed with the text they accompany, 
none of these images has that effect.”208
The image accompanying the textual warning 
“Cigarettes are addictive” depicts a man smoking 
through a tracheotomy opening in his throat.  
Viewed with the accompanying text, this image 
conveys the tenacity of nicotine addiction: even 
after undergoing surgery for cancer, one might be 
unable to abstain from smoking . . . . This image 
thus serves to underline the factual, and now 
uncontroversial, statement that cigarettes are highly 
addictive.  Similarly, the image of a man with 
staples in his chest lying on an autopsy table works 
with, not against, the textual warning “Smoking can 
kill you.” . . . [Additionally,] [t]he images of a baby 
enveloped in smoke and a woman crying both 
depict the significant harms of secondhand smoke.  
These images accompany the textual warnings 
“Tobacco smoke can harm your children” and 
“Tobacco smoke causes fatal lung disease in 
nonsmokers,” respectively . . . . Addressing 
potential purchasers of cigarettes, these two 
warning labels convey the message that smoking 
poses risks not only to them, but also to their family 
members and others . . . . [Furthermore,] the image 
of a man wearing a t-shirt that reads “I QUIT” . . . 
in connection with the textual warning “Quitting 
smoking now greatly reduces serious risks to your 
health,” [] conveys the message “I quit, and I am 
alive and healthy.”
  For instance, the 
Reynolds dissent held that: 
209
                                                                                                             
208 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1231 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012) (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
 
209 Id. at 1231–32 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
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However, the Reynolds dissent failed to provide any legal 
support for its assertion that the whole is greater than its parts.210  
Furthermore, such a notion fails to properly weigh the tobacco 
companies’ First Amendment right, to refrain from speaking, 
against the public’s right to be informed.211  Each compelled 
speech disclosure—that is, every compelled statement and every 
compelled graphic image—potentially violates the tobacco 
companies’ freedom of speech anew,212
Nevertheless, even assuming, arguendo, that the Reynolds 
dissent was correct in asserting that the graphic images need only 
be factually accurate as a whole (in conjunction with its 
corresponding textual warning) and thus Zauderer review applies 
to all nine graphic images, such would not alter the 
constitutionality of the five graphic images in question.
 and, thus, the 
constitutionality of each disclosure must be assessed individually.  
Accordingly, in determining whether Zauderer review applies, a 
court cannot merely look to whether a compelled disclosure in 
conjunction with another compelled disclosure constitutes a factual 
disclosure as a whole; rather, courts must assess the factual nature 
of each individual compelled speech disclosure. 
213  As this 
Note will demonstrate below, all nine graphic images fail to pass 
constitutional muster even under Zauderer’s “rational-basis” 
review.214
Finally, the “1–800–QUIT–NOW” telephone number, 
displayed in conjunction with the Final Rule’s nine textual and 
graphic warnings, also fails to depict any factual information 
regarding the health consequences of smoking; rather, the quit-line 
number merely provides a medium through which factual 
 
                                                                                                             
210 See id. 
211 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 500 (1996) (weighing the 
possibility that “‘a ban on speech could screen from public view the underlying 
governmental policy’”) (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n 
of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 n.9 (1980); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) 
(the right to refrain from speaking is protected under the First Amendment). 
212 See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 (the right to refrain from speaking is protected under 
the First Amendment). 
213 See infra Part III.B. 
214 See id. 
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information can be obtained.  Specifically, the FDA imposed this 
requirement in order “to provide a place where smokers and other 
members of the public can obtain smoking cessation information 
from staff trained specifically to help smokers quit by delivering 
unbiased and evidence-based information, advice, and support.”215
b) Cigarette Packages Are “Potentially Misleading” 
 
It appears that cigarette packages do constitute “potentially 
misleading” information.  It is true that there are no “congressional 
findings on the misleading nature of cigarette packaging itself.”216  
However, the Supreme Court has held that where “‘the likelihood 
of deception’ is ‘hardly a speculative one,’ the Government need 
not produce ‘evidence that [the] advertisements are 
misleading.’”217  Furthermore, the FDA claims that consumers are 
uninformed about “the nature and extent of the health risks 
associated with smoking cigarettes,”218 such as “the severity and 
magnitude” of those risks, their personal risks, the effects of 
secondhand smoke, and the highly addictive nature of cigarettes.219  
Accordingly, in light of the tobacco companies’ history of 
deceiving consumers about the negative health effects of 
smoking,220
As the D.C. Circuit’s dissent in Reynolds noted: 
 it seems clear that cigarette packages remain likely to 
mislead consumers notwithstanding the existing warnings. 
[I]t is [] beyond dispute that the tobacco companies 
have engaged in a decades-long campaign to 
deceive consumers about [the negative health 
effects of smoking] [].  [For instance,] [d]espite 
                                                                                                             
215 Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,524, 69,540 (Nov. 12, 2010) (to be codified at 21 
C.F.R. § 1141 (2011)). 
216 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1214–15 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012). 
217 Id. at 1227 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (citing Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Transp., 687 F.3d 403, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Milavetz, 
Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1340 (2010) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
218 Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628, 36,632 (June 22, 2011) (codified in 21 C.F.R. § 
1141 (2011)) 
219 Id. at 36,632–33. 
220 See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1224 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
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knowledge of “the negative health consequences of 
smoking, the addictiveness and manipulation of 
nicotine, [and] the harmfulness of secondhand 
smoke,” tobacco company executives “made, 
caused to be made, and approved public statements 
contrary to this knowledge.”  Specifically, they 
“publicly denied and distorted the truth about the 
addictive nature of their products, suppressed 
research revealing the addictiveness of nicotine, and 
denied their efforts to control nicotine levels and 
delivery,” all while “engineer[ing] their products 
around creating and sustaining [nicotine] 
addiction.”  The tobacco company executives 
“knew of the[ ] falsity” of their statements “at the 
time” and “made the statements with the intent to 
deceive.” . . . [Additionally,] Congress found that in 
2005 the tobacco companies “spent more than $13 
[billion] to attract new users, retain current users, 
increase current consumption, and generate 
favorable long-term attitudes toward smoking and 
tobacco use,” “often misleadingly portray[ing] the 
use of tobacco as socially acceptable and healthful 
to minors.”221
Moreover, in addition to the tobacco companies’ decades-long 
deception, it seems that cigarette packages, in their own right, 
actually deceive consumers if they do not properly warn 
consumers about tobacco’s serious health risks.
 
222
                                                                                                             
221 Id. (quoting United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1107, 1121, 
1124 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Smoking Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, §§ 2(16)–(17), 123 Stat. 1776, 
1778 (2009) (codified at 21 U.S.C § 387 Note (2011))). 
  The Supreme 
Court has expressly acknowledged this fact when it approvingly 
referenced the Federal Trade Commission’s conclusion that “[t]o 
avoid giving a false impression that smoking [is] innocuous, the 
cigarette manufacturer who represents the alleged pleasures or 
satisfactions of cigarette smoking in his advertising must also 
222 See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 527 (1992); Va. State Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976). 
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disclose the serious risks to life that smoking involves.”223  The 
Court also held that these disclosures may “appear in such a form, 
or include such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, 
as are necessary to prevent its being deceptive.”224
Additionally, the D.C. Circuit’s dissent in Reynolds noted that 
a previous D.C. Circuit case is instructive on the current issue.
 
225
[In] Spirit Airlines, [the D.C. Circuit] addressed a 
Department of Transportation (“DOT”) rule 
requiring that the most prominent number displayed 
in airfare advertisements be the total price, inclusive 
of taxes.  Notwithstanding the airlines’ compliance 
with preexisting regulations requiring 
advertisements to display the entire ticket cost as 
well as the amount of any tax, the court accepted 
[the] DOT’s determination, based on common sense 
and experience, “that it was deceitful and 
misleading when the most prominent price listed by 
an airline is anything other than the total, final price 
of air travel.”  Accordingly, the court proceeded to 
review the rule under Zauderer.  [Thus, the 
Reynolds dissent held that] [e]ven absent any 
affirmatively misleading statements, cigarette 
packages and other advertisements that fail to 
display the final costs of smoking in a prominent 
manner are at least as misleading as the airline 
advertisements in Spirit Airlines.
  
Specifically: 
226
Despite this evidence, among the Four Decisions, the D.C. 
Circuit alone holds that cigarette packages do not constitute 
 
                                                                                                             
223 Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 562–63 (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 527 (quoting 
Statement of Basis and Purpose, Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of 
Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8,356 (1964))) 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
224 Id. (quoting Va. State, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
225 See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1228 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
226 Id. (quoting Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 687 F.3d 403, 413 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012)) (citing Spirit Airlines, 687 F.3d at 408–09, 413–14). 
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“potentially misleading” speech.227  Nevertheless, even assuming, 
arguendo, that the D.C. Circuit was correct that cigarette packages 
do not constitute “potentially misleading” speech, such would not 
alter the constitutionality of the four graphic images in question.228  
As this Note will demonstrate below, all nine graphic images and 
the “1–800–QUIT–NOW” telephone number fail to pass 
constitutional muster even under Zauderer’s “rational-basis” 
review, much less “intermediate scrutiny” review.229
B. The Final Rule’s Graphic Images and “1–800–QUIT–NOW” 
Telephone Number Do Not Withstand “Intermediate Scrutiny” 
or “Rational-Basis” Review 
 
1. The FDA Cannot Demonstrate That the Graphic Images 
Advance the Government’s Interest 
None of the Four Decisions question the seemingly obvious 
purpose behind the Final Rule’s nine textual warnings, nor their 
ability to advance their intended outcome.230  Accordingly, this 
Note will proceed under the assumption that the nine textual 
warnings are intended to, and actually do, educate consumers on 
the negative health consequences of smoking.  Additionally, it 
seems clear that the “1–800–QUIT–NOW” telephone number’s 
purpose is to effect smoking cessation, and that the quit-line 
number actually advances that intended outcome.231
                                                                                                             
227 See id. at 1213–16 (majority holding cigarette packages do not constitute 
“potentially misleading” speech); see also Hardesty, supra note 
 
150, at 2850. But see 
Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1223 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (dissenting opinion holding cigarette 
packages do constitute “potentially misleading speech”); Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 562–
63 (majority holding cigarette packages do constitute “potentially misleading speech”); 
id. at 523–24 (Clay, J., dissenting) (dissenting opinion holding cigarette packages do 
constitute “potentially misleading” speech); Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 266 (failing to 
address the issue); Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 512 (failing to address the 
issue). 
228 See infra Part III.B. 
229 See id. 
230 See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1205; Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 509; Reynolds, 845 F. 
Supp. 2d at 266; Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 512. 
231 See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1234, 1236 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
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As the D.C. Circuit’s dissent in Reynolds stated, the quit-line 
telephone number is “not designed directly to inform consumers of 
the health consequences of smoking, but to assist smokers in their 
cessation efforts.”232  Furthermore, the dissent noted that “[t]he 
FDA imposed this requirement, pursuant to separate statutory 
authority, 21 U.S.C. § 387f(d), in order ‘to provide a place where 
smokers and other members of the public can obtain smoking 
cessation information from staff trained specifically to help 
smokers quit by delivering unbiased and evidence-based 
information, advice, and support.’”233
Additionally, the dissent held that: 
 
There [] is substantial evidence to support the 
FDA’s determination that the display of the “1–
800–QUIT–NOW” number will directly advance 
this interest [in reducing smoking rates].  The 
biological and psychological effects of nicotine 
“can make smoking cessation extremely difficult,” 
“about 40 percent of smokers try to quit” each year, 
but “95 percent of those who try to quit on their 
own relapse.” In comparison to minimal or no 
counseling interventions, quitlines have been found 
to “significantly increase abstinence rates.”  
International experience referenced in the 
rulemaking, further supports the common sense 
proposition that informing smokers of cessation 
resources is likely to increase rates of successful 
quit attempts.234
                                                                                                             
232 Id. (citing Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628, 36,681 (June 22, 2011) (codified at 21 
C.F.R. § 1141 (2011)). 
 
233 Id. at 1234 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (quoting Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,524, 
69,540 (Nov. 12, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2011)) (citing Final Rule, 76 
Fed. Reg. at 36,681). 
234 Id. at 1236 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (quoting President’s Cancer Panel, Promoting 
Healthy Lifestyles 62 (2007); Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,681, 36,687 (citing U.S. 
Dep’t Health & Human Servs., Public Health Serv., Treating Tobacco Use and 
Dependence: 2008 Update 91 (May 2008)) (citing Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,682) 
(other internal citations omitted). 
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However, regarding the Final Rule’s nine graphic images, it is 
unclear whether the FDA articulated one or two complementary 
interests—to effect smoking cessation and/or to educate consumers 
on the negative health consequences of smoking.235  Furthermore, 
there is disagreement among the Four Decisions on whether either 
interest constitutes a “substantial interest” under Central 
Hudson.236  Nevertheless, it appears that the nine graphic images 
fail to advance the intended outcome of either interest, and, thus, 
cannot withstand Central Hudson or Zauderer review.237
a) The FDA’s Interest in Utilizing Graphic Images 
 
A review of the Smoking Act and the administrative record 
makes clear that the FDA’s primary interest in requiring the Final 
Rule’s graphic warnings is to encourage current smokers to quit 
and dissuade other consumers from ever buying cigarettes.238  For 
instance, one of the Smoking Act’s many stated purposes is 
“promot[ing] cessation to reduce disease risk and the social costs 
associated with tobacco-related diseases.”239  Additionally, in its 
Final Rule, the FDA explained that “this effective communication 
can help both to discourage nonsmokers, including minor children, 
from initiating cigarette use and to encourage current smokers to 
consider cessation to greatly reduce the serious risks that smoking 
poses to their health.”240
                                                                                                             
235 See infra Part III.B.1.a. 
  Furthermore, in the preamble to its 
Proposed Rule, the FDA also stated that it has a “substantial 
236 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
566 (1980); infra Part III.B.1.a. 
237 See infra Part III.B.1.b. 
238 See Smoking Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 3(9), 123 Stat. 1776, 1782 (2009) (codified 
at 21 U.S.C § 387 Note (2011)); Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1218; Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 
36,628, 36,628, 36,633, 36,640 (June 22, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2011)); 
Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,524, 69,525 (Nov. 12, 2010) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 
1141 (2011)). 
239 Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1218 (alteration in original) (quoting the Smoking Act § 3(9) 
(codified at 21 U.S.C § 387 Note (2011))) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
240 Id. at 1225 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (quoting Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,633) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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interest in reducing the number of Americans, particularly children 
and adolescents, who use cigarettes and other tobacco products.”241
Moreover, the Institute of Medicine Report, on which the FDA 
relied for some of its evidence supporting its Final Rule,
 
242 states 
unequivocally that “the primary objective of tobacco regulation is 
not to promote informed choice but rather to discourage 
consumption of tobacco products . . . as a means of reducing 
tobacco-related death and disease.”243  The report further states 
that “[e]ven though tobacco products are legally available to 
adults, the paramount public health aim is to reduce the number of 
people who use and become addicted to these products, through a 
focus on children and youths,” and recommend that the “warnings 
must be designed to promote this objective.”244  Finally, David 
Hammond, one of the principal researchers on whom the FDA 
relies,245 recommended that “the graphic warnings should ‘elicit 
negative emotional reactions’ to convince smokers to quit.”246
It is true that, both in its Proposed Rule and Final Rule, the 
FDA stated that its “primary goal” in selecting the nine graphic 
images is to “effectively convey the negative health consequences 
of smoking on cigarette packages.”
 
247
                                                                                                             
241 Id. at 1218 (quoting Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,525) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
  However, it seems that this 
242 See id. at 1218 n.12. 
243 Id. (quoting INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, ENDING THE 
TOBACCO PROBLEM: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE NATION 291 (Richard J. Bonnie, Kathleen 
Stratton, and Robert B. Wallace eds., 2007), available at http://www.iom.edu/Reports/
2007/Ending-the-Tobacco-Problem-A-Blueprint-for-the-Nation.aspx) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
244 Id. (quoting INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, ENDING THE 
TOBACCO PROBLEM: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE NATION, supra note 243 (alteration in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
245 See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1220; R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. United States Food 
and Drug Admin., 845 F. Supp. 2d 266, 273 (D.D.C. 2011). 
246 Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 273 (quoting David Hammond, Health Warnings 
Messages on Tobacco Products: A Review, 20 TOBACCO CONTROL 327, 331–32 
(2011), available at http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/20/5/327.full.pdf). 
247 Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628, 36,633 (June 22, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 
1141 (2011)); see also Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1235 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (quoting Final 
Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,641) (citing Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,630, 36,633–42, 
36,646–47, 36,696–97, 36,699); Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,524, 69,526, 69531–35 
(Nov. 12, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2011)) (“the purpose of these 
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purported interest merely describes the means by which the FDA is 
attempting to fulfill its true interest in reducing smoking rates.  As 
the FDA stated, “[t]he goal of effectively communicating the risks 
of cigarette smoking is, of course, related to the viewer’s decision 
to quit, or never to start, smoking.”248  In fact, the Reynolds district 
court went so far as to suggest that “the Government appears to 
have chosen this ‘informational’ goal as its official purpose 
because it most closely mirrors the Zauderer exception and would 
thus be subject to a lesser standard of scrutiny.”249
Furthermore, the notion that the FDA’s true goal in requiring 
the graphic images is to educate consumers does not seem to 
comport with the evidence the FDA used to support its Final 
Rule.
 
250
[T]he Government—through its own data and, in 
fact, its own words—evinces a purpose wholly 
separate from education.  In particular, the 
Government spends much of its brief discussing the 
18,000-consumer study that the FDA commissioned 
to help determine which of the 36 proposed graphic 
images it would ultimately select.  In so doing, the 
Government acknowledges that the study 
was not designed to assess whether the proposed 
graphic images would have a statistically significant 
impact on consumer awareness of smoking risks, 
but rather to “assess[ ] the relative impact of 
different warnings based on participants’ exposure 
to one graphic warning on one occasion.”  Thus, 
instead of focusing on its own alleged primary 
goal—providing information to consumers—the 
Government effectively admits that it looked only 
to relative impact, thus side-stepping the basic 
  As the Reynolds district court held: 
                                                                                                             
required warnings is to communicate effectively and graphically the very real, 
scientifically established adverse health consequences of smoking.”)). 
248 Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1221 (alteration in original) (quoting Appellants’ Brief at 47) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
249 Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 47. 
250 See id. at 47–48. 
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question of whether any singular graphic warning 
was effective on its own terms.  This fundamental 
failure, coupled with the Government’s emphasis on 
the images’ ability to provoke emotion, strongly 
suggests that the Government’s actual purpose is 
not to inform, but rather to advocate a change in 
consumer behavior.251
Moreover, the FDA’s reliance on the graphic images—which 
“were chosen based on their ability to provoke emotion, a criterion 
that does not address whether the graphic images affect 
consumers’ knowledge of smoking risks”—coupled with the toll 
free number buttresses the conclusion that “the Government’s 
actual purpose is to convince consumers that they should ‘QUIT 
NOW.’”
 
252
Despite this evidence, there is disagreement among the Four 
Decisions regarding whether the FDA actually articulated two 
complementary, but distinct, interests in requiring the graphic 
warning labels: (1) an interest in effectively conveying information 
about the negative health consequences of smoking to consumers; 
and (2) an interest in decreasing smoking rates.
 
253
It seems clear that the FDA’s interest in educating consumers 
on the negative health effects of smoking constitutes a “substantial 
interest.”  For instance, the Supreme Court held that “there is no 
  Accordingly, in 
an abundance of caution, this Note will proceed with its analysis 
under the assumption that the FDA articulated both an interest to 
educate consumers and to encourage smoking cessation. 
                                                                                                             
251 Id. (quoting Defendants’ Opposition at 29) (citing Defendants’ Opposition at 27–
30); see also Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 275. 
252 Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 275. 
253 See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1218 n.12 (holding the FDA’s primary interest is to 
encourage smoking cessation); id. at 1223 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (dissenting opinion 
holding that the FDA articulated complementary interests in educating the public and 
encouraging smoking cessation); Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery v. United States, 674 
F.3d 509, 561–67 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding the FDA’s interest is to educate consumers); 
id. at 528–29 (Clay, J., dissenting) (dissenting opinion holding the FDA’s interest is to 
educate consumers); Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 275 (holding the FDA’s sole interest is 
to encourage smoking cessation); Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. 
Supp. 2d 512, 530 (W.D. Ky. 2010) (holding the FDA’s interest is to educate consumers). 
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question that [the government’s] interest in ensuring the accuracy 
of commercial information in the marketplace is substantial.”254  
However, it seems that the FDA’s interest in encouraging smoking 
cessation does not constitute a “substantial interest.”  It is true that 
the Supreme Court held that “‘tobacco use, particularly among 
children and adolescents, poses perhaps the single most significant 
threat to public health in the United States,’”255 and that “the 
government has a substantial interest in promoting the health, 
safety, and welfare of its citizens.”256  However, the Supreme 
Court has also held that “where the State’s interest is to 
disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such 
interest cannot outweigh an individual’s First Amendment right to 
avoid becoming the courier for such message.”257
Despite the Supreme Court’s ruling, there is disagreement 
across the Four Decisions regarding whether the FDA’s interests in 
educating consumers and encouraging smoking cessation 
constitutes a “substantial interests.” 
 
258  In fact, the D.C. Circuit in 
Reynolds held that the FDA could not even articulate an interest in 
educating consumers as “an interest in ‘effective’ communication 
is too vague to stand on its own.”259
                                                                                                             
254 Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1235 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (quoting Pearson v. Shalala, 164 
F.3d 650, 656 (D.C. Cir.1999)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
  Though this determination is 
255 Id. (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 
(2000)). 
256 Id. (quoting Pearson, 164 F.3d at 656) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
257 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717. 
258 See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1218 n.13 (uncertain as to whether encouraging smoking 
cessation is a substantial interest); id. at 1221 (holding FDA cannot articulate a 
substantial interest in educating consumers); id. at 1235 (Rogers, J., dissenting) 
(dissenting opinion holding the FDA’s interest in educating consumers is substantial); id. 
at 1236 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (dissenting opinion holding the FDA’s interest in 
encouraging smoking cessation is substantial); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. United 
States Food and Drug Admin., 845 F. Supp. 2d 266, 275 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding the 
FDA’s interests in encouraging smoking cessation is not substantial). 
259   Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1221.  As the circuit stated, “[i]ndeed, the government’s 
chosen buzzwords, which it reiterates through the rulemaking, prompt an obvious 
question: ‘effective’ in what sense?  Allowing [the] FDA to define ‘effectiveness’ 
however it sees fit would not only render Central Hudson’s ‘substantial interest’ 
requirement a complete nullity, but it would also eviscerate the requirement that any 
restriction ‘directly advance’ that interest.” Id. (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)). 
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irrelevant regarding the Final Rule’s four factual images and nine 
textual warnings, as the government need not demonstrate a 
“substantial interest” under “rational-basis” review,260 it is 
necessary regarding the Final Rule’s five non-factual images and 
the “1–800–QUIT–NOW” telephone number—which are reviewed 
under “intermediate scrutiny.”261
b) Lack of Statistical Evidence Regarding the Final Rule’s 
Graphic Images 
  Accordingly, in an abundance of 
caution, this Note will proceed with its analysis under the 
assumption that the FDA has a “substantial interest” in both 
educating consumers and encouraging smoking cessation. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the FDA articulated a 
“substantial interest” in both educating consumers and encouraging 
smoking cessation, the Final Rule’s nine graphic images do not 
even withstand “rational-basis” review.262  The FDA has failed to 
demonstrate a “rational connection” between the government’s 
interests and the means used to achieve those interests,263 much 
less a regulation that directly advances the government’s interest, 
as required under “intermediate scrutiny.”264
As the Reynolds district court stated regarding the FDA’s 
interest in educating consumers: 
 
[T]he Government argues that “[t]the most relevant 
metric in evaluating the warnings is . . . the extent to 
which they more effectively convey information 
about health risks to consumers and potential 
customers.”  Yet it offers no evidence pointing to 
the FDA’s attempt to measure improvement in this 
area, much less whether the warnings actually 
achieved the purported goal of increasing consumer 
awareness.  Needless to say, generalized scientific 
                                                                                                             
260 See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 
626, 651 (1985). 
261 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
566 (1980). 
262 See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. 
263 See id. 
264 See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
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literature and the “experiences of countries such as 
Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom” (none 
of which afford First Amendment protections like 
those found in our Constitution), say nothing about 
the nine graphic images at issue in this case.265
Furthermore, regarding the FDA’s interest in effecting smoking 
cessation, the D.C. Circuit in Reynolds held that: 
 
The FDA makes much of the “international 
consensus” surrounding the effectiveness of large 
graphic warnings, but offers no evidence showing 
that such warnings have [] caused a material 
decrease in smoking rates in any of the countries 
that now require them.  While studies of Canadian 
and Australian youth smokers showed that the 
warnings on cigarette packs caused a substantial 
number of survey participants to think—or think 
more—about quitting smoking, and [the] FDA 
might be correct that intentions are a “necessary 
precursor” to behavior change, it is mere 
speculation to suggest that respondents who report 
increased thoughts about quitting smoking will 
actually follow through on their intentions.  And at 
no point did these studies attempt to evaluate 
whether the increased thoughts about smoking 
cessation led participants to actually quit.  Another 
Australian study reported increased quit attempts by 
survey participants after that country enacted large 
graphic warnings, but found “no association with 
short-term quit success.”  Some Canadian and 
Australian studies indicated that large graphic 
warnings might induce individual smokers to reduce 
consumption, or to help persons who have already 
quit smoking remain abstinent.  But again, the study 
did not purport to show that the implementation of 
                                                                                                             
265 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 823 F. Supp. 2d 36, 48 
n.21 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Defendants’ Opposition at 23, 24). 
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large graphic warnings has actually led to a 
reduction in smoking rates.266
Finally, the D.C. Circuit noted that: 
 
The FDA’s Regulatory Impact Analysis 
(“RIA”) essentially concedes the agency lacks any 
evidence showing that the graphic warnings are 
likely to reduce smoking rates.  One way in which 
the RIA analyzed the expected benefits of the Rule 
was by comparing the impact of similar warnings 
introduced in Canada in 2000.  It (1) analyzed the 
change in smoking trends in Canada before and 
after 2000; (2) assumed any difference in the post-
2000 change between Canada and the United States 
was solely attributable to the introduction of graphic 
warnings; and (3) assumed similar warnings would 
have an identical impact on U.S. smoking rates.  
Describing its approach as “rudimentary,” [the] 
FDA acknowledged that apart from differences in 
cigarette taxes, the RIA “d[id] not account for 
potential confounding variables,” such as the 
introduction of more stringent smoking bans and 
advertising restrictions in Canada during the 
relevant time period, or the fact that Canadian 
cigarette prices are generally higher than U.S. 
prices . . . [In fact,] [t]he RIA estimated the new 
warnings would reduce U.S. smoking rates by a 
mere 0.088%, a number the FDA concedes is “in 
general not statistically distinguishable from zero.”  
Indeed, because it had access to “very small data 
sets,” [the] FDA could not even reject the statistical 
                                                                                                             
266 Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1219 (citing Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628, 36,642 (June 
22, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2011)); Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,524, 
69,532 (Nov. 12, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2011))). 
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possibility that the Rule would have no impact on 
U.S. smoking rates.267
2. The Final Rule’s Graphic Images and “1–800–QUIT–
NOW” Telephone Number are Unduly Burdensome 
 
None of the Four Decisions assert that requiring textual 
warnings on cigarette packages is unduly burdensome.268  In fact, 
requiring textual messages on cigarette packages has been an 
acceptable practice since the 1960s.269  Additionally, the tobacco 
companies themselves do not contest replacing the Surgeon 
General’s warnings, currently displayed on the sides of cigarette 
packages, with any of Congress’s nine new textual warnings.270
Furthermore, because the textual warnings merely inform 
consumers of the negative health consequences of smoking, and do 
not seem to actively encourage smokers to quit,
 
271 the nine textual 
warnings do not appear to directly contradict the tobacco 
companies’ interest in selling cigarettes.  Moreover, the Supreme 
Court has held that “the least restrictive means is not the standard; 
instead, the case law requires a reasonable fit between the 
legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those 
ends.”272  Thus, it appears that the textual warnings’ position and 
size, and the FDA’s failure to utilize other alternatives, are not 
unduly burdensome.273
                                                                                                             
267 Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1219–20 (citing Final Rule, 76 Fed Reg. at 36,719–20, 
36,720–21, 36,755, 36,776; Plaintiffs’ Comment Letter on Proposed Rule (Jan. 11, 2010) 
and Statement of Robert S. Maness). 
  Accordingly, it seems that the Final Rule’s 
nine textual warnings are constitutional. 
268 See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1205; Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery v. United States, 674 
F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. United States Food and Drug 
Admin., 845 F. Supp. 2d 266 (D.D.C. 2011); Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United 
States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. Ky. 2010). 
269 See supra Part I.A. 
270 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 823 F. Supp. 2d 36, 
43 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing the Trial Record at 9:24–25–10:1–3; 15:11–12). 
271 See supra Part III.B.i. 
272 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 556 (2001) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
273 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 
651 (1985). 
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However, it is clear that the “1–800–QUIT–NOW” telephone 
number is intended to effect smoking cessation.274  Additionally, 
the Final Rule’s nine graphic images seem to “go beyond the 
textual warnings to shame and repulse smokers and denigrate 
smoking as an antisocial act . . .  ‘[B]y effectively shouting . . . that 
the risks from smoking outweigh the pleasure that smokers derive 
from it, and that smokers make bad personal decisions, and should 
stop smoking.’ . . . In effect, the graphic images are not warnings, 
but admonitions: ‘[D]on’t buy or use this product.’”275
Furthermore, combined, these factors significantly increase the 
likelihood that the graphic warnings cross the line from 
information to advocacy, where the FDA “has ‘conscript[ed] 
[tobacco manufacturers] into an anti-smoking brigade.’”
  This 
emotive attack goes beyond merely informing individuals of the 
negative health effects of smoking, and takes an active role in 
encouraging smoking cessation. 
276  
Accordingly, it appears that the nine graphic images and the quit-
line number directly contradict the tobacco companies’ desired 
message at the point of sale—that consumers should purchase 
cigarettes—thereby imposing a significant burden on their 
protected commercial speech.277
It is true that the least restrictive means is not necessary for 
finding a “reasonable fit” between the FDA’s utilized means and 
purported ends to uphold the challenged rule.
 
278  However, the 
Supreme Court held that “if there are numerous and obvious less-
burdensome alternatives to the restriction on commercial speech, 
that is certainly a relevant consideration in determining whether 
the ‘fit’ between ends and means is reasonable.”279
                                                                                                             
274 See supra Part III.B.i. 
  Thus, it seems 
275 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1211–12 
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (alterations in original). 
276 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 823 F. Supp. 2d 36, 
49 n.28 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Trial Record at 33:19–20). 
277 See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1236 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
278 See Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 556; see also Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 n.14 
(“We reject appellant’s contention that we should subject disclosure requirements to a 
strict ‘least restrictive means’ analysis.”). 
279 Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 523 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(Clay, J., dissenting) (quoting City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 
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that: (1) the images’ and the quit-line number’s position and size; 
(2) the images’ graphic nature; and (3) the FDA’s failure to utilize 
other alternatives to both the images and the quit-line number are 
unduly burdensome.  Accordingly, it appears that the Final Rule’s 
nine graphic images and the “1–800–QUIT–NOW” telephone 
number are unconstitutional even under “rational-basis” review. 
a) The Graphic Images’ and the “1–800–QUIT–NOW” 
Telephone Number’s Position and Size 
The graphic images’ and the “1–800–QUIT–NOW” telephone 
number’s sheer size and placement requirements alone suggest that 
they are unduly burdensome.280  By requiring that the top fifty 
percent of the front and back panels of cigarette packages display 
the Final Rule’s warning labels, the tobacco companies are forced 
to act as the government’s mouthpiece and disseminate the 
government’s anti-smoking message: Do not purchase this 
product.281  These dimensions “alone clearly demonstrate ‘that the 
Rule was designed to achieve the very objective articulated by the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services: to ‘rebrand[ ] our 
cigarette packs,’ treating (as the FDA Commissioner announced 
last year) ‘every single pack of cigarettes in our country’ as a 
‘mini-billboard.’  A ‘mini-billboard,’ indeed, for its obvious anti-
smoking agenda!’”282
Instead of requiring that the graphic warnings be displayed on 
the top fifty percent of the front and back panels of cigarette 
packages, the government could reduce the space appropriated for 
 
                                                                                                             
410, 417 n.13 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Rubin v. Coors Brewing 
Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491 (1995) (finding that “‘the availability of alternatives that would 
prove less intrusive to the First Amendment’s protections for commercial speech’” 
further highlighted the statute’s defects)); see also Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651, 653 n.15 
(analyzing whether the compelled disclosure was unduly burdensome before holding the 
regulation reasonably related to the state’s interest under “rational-basis” review). 
280 See Smoking Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201(a), 123 Stat. 1776, 1843 (2009) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. 2009)) (providing the size and 
placement requirements for the warning labels). 
281 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. United States Food and Drug Admin., 845 F. 
Supp. 2d 266, 275–76 (D.D.C. 2011). 
282 Id. (quoting R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 823 F. Supp. 
2d 36, 48 n.28 (D.D.C. 2011)) (emphasis in original). 
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the warnings to twenty percent of the packaging; alternatively, the 
government could require graphic warnings on only the front or 
the back of cigarette packaging, not both.283  Additionally, if the 
FDA’s concern is that consumers will not see the warnings if they 
are displayed on a smaller scale, the government could instead 
enlarge the textual warnings.284
Furthermore, simply because the Smoking Act directed the 
FDA to impose a rule consistent with its provisions regarding size 
and position does not mean that the Final Rule will automatically 
pass constitutional muster.
 
285  In fact, as the Reynolds district court 
stated, “the parties have conceded, there is no evidence that 
Congress even considered the First Amendment implications when 
drafting the Smoking Act.”286
The FDA’s contention that neither it nor this Court 
has the authority to second-guess Congress, even if 
the congressional mandate violates the First 
Amendment, is an oh-too-convenient dodge . . . . To 
say the least, implementing a Final Rule consistent 
with a congressional mandate does not require a 
Court to hold that the Rule automatically passes 
constitutional muster.  Congress must pass laws, 
and the FDA must implement final rules, that are 
consistent with the requirements of the 
Constitution.
  Moreover, as the district court held: 
287
b) The Images’ Graphic Nature 
 
It seems clear that utilizing pictorial warnings on cigarette 
warning labels serves an important purpose.  For instance, pictorial 
warnings can stimulate individuals into contemplating the negative 
                                                                                                             
283 See id. at 276 (citing Plaintiffs’ Motion at 29–30). 
284 See Bennett, supra note 25, at 1925. 
285 See Smoking Act § 201(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. 2009)) 
(providing the size and placement requirements for the warning labels); Sempeles, supra 
note 22, at 244. 
286 Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 275–76 (citing Summary Judgment Trial Record 
30:10–13 (defendants); 42:3–13 (plaintiffs)). 
287 Id. (citing Summary Judgment Trial Record 36:22–25; 37:13–17; Reynolds, 823 F. 
Supp. 2d at 48 n.25). 
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health consequences of smoking to an extent unlike textual 
warnings.288  Additionally, pictorial warnings can caution an 
illiterate or non-English speaking audience on the dangers of 
cigarettes, information they would be unable to receive through the 
mandated English textual warnings.289
However, there are other less burdensome alternatives to using 
pictorial warnings with a graphic component that would still allow 
the government to utilize the advantages inherent in pictorial 
warnings.  Specifically, the government could employ images that 
convey only purely factual and uncontroversial information, rather 
than those of a graphic nature designed to disgust the consumer.
 
290
[The tobacco companies do not object to 
publishing] a graph demonstrating the difficulty of 
quitting smoking by showing the correlation 
between the number of people who try to quit and 
the percentage who actually do . . . [or to 
publishing] . . . a “graphic that depicts the types of 
harms that befall children if they are exposed to 
secondhand smoke or the types of birth defects that 
arise, and their likelihood, if mothers smoke during 
the course of pregnancy.”
  
In fact, the Reynolds district court noted that: 
291
Furthermore, the government could utilize bilingual warnings 
for non-English speaking citizens, or a picture of the world-
renowned symbol for danger, a skull and crossbones, for illiterate 
citizens.
 
292
                                                                                                             
288 See Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,524, 69,531–35 (Nov. 12, 2010) (to be codified 
at 21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2011)) (collecting scientific evidence). 
 
289 See Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 563 (6th Cir. 
2012) (citation omitted); Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,531; Bennett, supra note 25, 
at 1924. 
290 See Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 276 (citing Plaintiffs’ Motion at 30). 
291 Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 48–49 (quoting Trial Record at 20:18–21) (citing 
Defendants’ Opposition at 22; Trial Record at 20:5–8). 
292 See Bennett, supra note 25, at 1924 n.62 (“The symbol of a skull and crossbones is 
used by both the United States and the United Nations to symbolize dangerous, toxic, or 
hazardous material.”) (citing EPA, PESTICIDES: INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES, SKULL AND 
CROSSBONES, http://www.epa.gov/oppfead1/international/ghs/skull-crossbones.htm (last 
visited July 9, 2013)). 
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c) Alternatives to Utilizing Graphic Images and the “1–
800–QUIT–NOW” Telephone Number 
Even if the FDA eliminated the pictorial warnings’ graphic 
nature and altered the images’ and the “1–800–QUIT–NOW” 
telephone number’s position and size, there are still other possible 
alternatives the government could utilize as a less restrictive means 
of conveying the negative health consequences of smoking. 
i. Counter-Speech Informational Campaigns 
First, as the Reynolds district court stated, “the Government 
could disseminate its anti-smoking message itself, for example, by 
increasing its anti-smoking advertisements or issuing additional 
statements in the press urging consumers to quit smoking or 
both.”293  Such methods have proven effective in encouraging 
smoking cessation.  For instance, a decrease in smoking directly 
correlated the American Cancer Society’s and other groups’ anti-
smoking campaigns in the 1960s.294
ii. School-Based Prevention Programs 
 
Second, the government could create more school-based 
smoking prevention programs to specifically target and discourage 
smoking among adolescents.295  These programs could directly 
influence the youth population by providing them with information 
about the potential harms of smoking.296  In fact, studies have 
shown that school-based programs centered on the Social-
Influence-Resistance Model are effective in long-term smoking 
prevention among youths.297
iii. Informational Inserts 
 
Third, the government could utilize informational inserts as 
used with other legal products sold in the United States.298
                                                                                                             
293 Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 276 (citing Plaintiffs’ Motion at 28). 
  For 
294 See Sempeles, supra note 22, at 248 (citing Kathleen M. Sullivan, Muzzle Joe 
Camel? It May Be Illegal, NEWSDAY, May 30, 1996, at A51). 
295 See id. 
296 See id. 
297 See id. (citing PETER D. JACOBSON ET AL., COMBATING TEEN SMOKING: RESEARCH 
AND POLICY STRATEGIES 117–18 (2001)). 
298 See id. at 249. 
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instance, “the government requires information leaflets to be 
included within contraceptive packaging.”299  The government 
believes that these informational inserts are an efficient way to 
warn the public about the potential health consequences that could 
occur from using contraceptives.300  Similarly, the government 
could require that information leaflets describing the dangers of 
smoking be included within every cigarette package.301
iv. Banning Public Smoking 
 
Fourth, the government could encourage municipalities and 
states to follow cities in Maine, Texas, Oregon, New York, and 
Michigan, and ban tobacco use in public places.302  Banning 
smoking in public places has proven effective overseas in 
encouraging smoking cessation.303  For instance, a London ban on 
public smoking encouraged over 400,000 London smokers to 
quit.304
v. Increasing Cigarette Taxes 
 
Fifth, the FDA could lobby for increased federal taxes on 
tobacco products and encourage states to tax tobacco products at a 
                                                                                                             
299 Id. (citing Dunkin v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 121 (W.D. Tenn. 
1977)). 
300 See id. at 249 n.223 (“The case held that, as a matter of law, a leaflet contained in 
each birth control pill dispenser was an adequate warning given by the drug 
manufacturer.”) (citing Dunkin v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 121, 123 (W.D. 
Tenn. 1977)). 
301 See id. 
302 See Bennett, supra note 25, at 1936 (citing Katharine Q. Seelye, Increasingly, 
Smoking Indoors Is Forbidden at Public Housing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2011, at 
A25, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/us/public-housing-authorities-
increasingly-ban-indoor-smoking.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Report: Ban Smoking in 
Public Places, Surgeon General says 126 Million Nonsmokers Exposed to Tobacco 
Hazards, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 27, 2006, 4:11 PM), available at 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/13569976/ns/health-addictions/t/report-ban-smokingpublic-
places). 
303 See id. 
304 See id. (citing Smoking Bans Spurs 400,000 People to Quit the Habit, DAILY MAIL 
REP. (July 4, 2008, 4:23 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-1030575/
Smoking-ban-spurs-400-000-people-quit-habit.html). 
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higher rate.305  According to the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, “‘a 10% increase in price [alone] . . . [would] reduce 
overall cigarette consumption among adolescents and young adults 
by about 4%.’”306  Although, as the Liquormart Court discussed, 
severe addicts may not be affected by a “‘marginal price increase’ 
on tobacco products and instead choose to forego necessities to 
feed their habit,”307
vi. Increased Penalties Surrounding Underage Tobacco 
Use 
 this method may deter less-addicted 
individuals from smoking. 
Finally, the FDA could encourage stricter federal and state 
statutory penalties for the sale of tobacco products to underage 
individuals.308  Additionally, increasing the enforcement of current 
state laws that prohibit the sale of tobacco products to minors and 
criminalizing the possession, not just use, of tobacco products for 
minors may also prove effective.309  As the Campaign for 
Tobacco-Free Kids states, “‘strong enforcement of youth access 
laws [has] substantially reduced illegal sales to minors’ in many 
states already, including California and Massachusetts.”310
CONCLUSION 
 
Assuming the role of surrogate parent, the FDA wishes to teach 
us that the antitheses to the old adage “an apple a day keeps the 
                                                                                                             
305 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. United States Food and Drug Admin., 845 F. 
Supp. 2d 266, 276 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Plaintiffs’ Motion at 29); Bennett, supra note 
25, at 1934. 
306 Bennett, supra note 25, at 1935 (quoting Smoking & Tobacco Use: Economic Facts 
About U.S. Tobacco Production and Use, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/
economics/econ_facts). 
307 Id. (quoting 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 506 (1996)). 
308 See Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 276 (citing Plaintiffs’ Motion at 29); Bennett, 
supra note 25, at 1938. 
309 See Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 276 (citing Plaintiffs’ Motion at 29); Sempeles, 
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pdf/0049.pdf). 
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doctor away” is “a pack a day and the doctor will stay to treat your 
lung cancer, emphysema, stroke, and heart disease.”311  As 
children, our parents force us to eat our vegetables so we can grow 
up strong and healthy.  As youths and adults, the FDA is 
employing graphic images to “shock” us into quitting smoking so 
we can remain healthy.  However, in the spirit of challenging 
authority, courts must join the rebellious teenager within us in 
sarcastically retorting OMG, FDA, TMI.312
The Final Rule’s requirements regarding its images’ graphic 
nature, position, and size, as well as the “1–800–QUIT–NOW” 
telephone number’s position and size, provide “too much 
information” and are unduly burdensome.  Furthermore, the Final 
Rule’s graphic images also fail to advance the FDA’s interest in 
encouraging smoking cessation.  Thus, except for its textual 
warnings, the Final Rule’s nine graphic warning labels fail to 
withstand all three constitutional standards of review. 
 
However, like all parents, the FDA refuses to “just leave us 
alone.”  Instead, the FDA intends to modify its graphic cigarette 
warning labels, perhaps presaging its regulating alcohol and 
McDonald’s “Big Mac” hamburgers.  Accordingly, prospective 
courts must ensure that the FDA’s redesigned warning labels 
accord with the principles set forth, above, in Part III.B.2 of this 
Note.  Otherwise, unless courts curtail the FDA’s “parental rights” 
to make our personal choices for us, the FDA, drunk with power, is 
likely to continue ordering “graphic warning labels all around.” 
 
                                                                                                             
311 See Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,524, 69,527–29 (Nov. 12, 2010) (to be codified 
at 21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2011) (collecting scientific evidence). 
312 See Definition of TMI in English, OXFORD DICTIONARIES (2013), 
http://oxfordictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/TMI (“TMI” is the 
abbreviation for “Too Much Information.”); Definition of OMG in English, OXFORD 
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